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
ALLEN WELSH DULLES
AS DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
26 FEBRUARY 1953 - 29 NOVEMBER 1961

VOLUME III COVERT ACTIVITIES

DCI-2

by

Wayne G. Jackson



HISTORICAL STAFF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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Allen Welsh Dulles
As Director of Central Intelligence
26 February 1953 - 29 November 1961

Volume III Covert Activities

Chapter 1

Policy Guidance for Covert Activities

It might seem appropriate to give the Clandestine Services top billing in any account of Dulles's administration. These functions were of greatest personal interest to him and were the activities to which he devoted a large part of his time. Two or three mornings a week Dulles met with all his principal deputies and top staff (referred to hereafter as the Deputies meetings). Minutes were kept of the principal topics discussed. Overwhelmingly they dealt with matters of concern to the Clandestine Services, largely in the field

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of covert action.*

It would be a mistake to take this fact as evidence of the proportion of time which Dulles spent on clandestine matters. The myriad other subjects with which he concerned himself did not, in most cases, require that they be discussed in the Deputies meetings. Housekeeping problems in the Agency were generally handled otherwise, and the same was true of formal intelligence estimates, Congressional relations, and intelligence support to the White House. But the predominance of discussions of matters relating to covert action does indicate Dulles's great interest in such matters.

From the earliest days of the Agency, it was a cardinal principle, enshrined in the basic directives governing covert action, that such action be carried on in a manner consistent with US foreign policy. Dulles shared with both Presidents under whom he served as DCI and with the NSC the concern

* By covert action is meant operations in the political, psychological, propaganda, and paramilitary fields as distinguished from clandestine intelligence collection.

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that covert actions should receive policy guidance from those officers who were charged with policy making, primarily the Department of State.

The charge has often been leveled at CIA, however, that in its covert operations it made the policy which it was carrying out. When Senator Mansfield in 1956 introduced into the Senate a resolution to set up a watchdog committee to supervise CIA, this was one of the principal allegations which he and his supporters made. Senator Eugene McCarthy, in a piece he published in *The Saturday Evening Post* in 1964, 1/* made the same indictment. It is not clear how much these allegations were based on a sincere belief in their truth and how much on a general distaste for the whole concept of secret political action, a belief that such action is immoral and inconsistent with a free democratic system of government. When ex-President Truman said in a newspaper article in 1963,

For some time I have been disturbed by the way CIA has been diverted from its original assignment. It has become an

* For serially numbered source references, see Appendix A.

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operational and at times a policymaking
arm of government. 2/

he was forgetful of the fact that covert activities were sanctioned by him many times, starting with NSC 4-A, five months after his approval of the National Security Act.* Shortly after this Truman piece was published, the then DCI, John A. McCone, sent his deputy, General Marshall Carter, and Enno H. Knoche, one of Mr. McCone's personal assistants, to see Truman. Knoche recalled (in 1970) that when Truman was reminded that as President he had approved covert action in the earliest days of CIA -- e.g., in the cases of the Italian [REDACTED] -- Truman said, in substance, "You're right and I would do it again today." Knoche believes that a ghost-writer produced the piece published under Truman's name and that the latter may not even have read it carefully.

Whatever the underlying motivation of the charge of "policymaking," the fact remains that it

* For a list of the principal documents controlling covert action, see Appendix C; for the membership of groups dealing with covert action, see Appendix D.

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has been frequently made. Consequently, some discussion of its validity is in order. Even those writers whose aim has been to be sensational, to produce exposés of CIA, do not make the charge without a great deal of qualification. Andrew Tully, in his book *CIA -- The Inside Story* was not writing a defense of CIA. He says

Over the past decade, there has been considerable confusion in the mind of the average American as to whether CIA was actually *making* foreign policy as well as acting as a kind of scout for and instrument of that policy Broadly speaking, CIA operates *within the confines* of policy in a given area of the world, but decisions on day-to-day operations have been left to the judgment of its director and often to the man in charge on the scene, and under these circumstances CIA sometimes has overstepped the boundaries of its responsibilities and powers. [Italics in original] 3/

Wise and Ross in their book *The Invisible Government* 4/ alleged that there was a sinister conspiratorial system responsible for secret political and paramilitary projects. They described at some length the "Special Group" or "54/12 Group" (sic) which, they said, makes the important decisions. 5/ They then deflate their own case by describing the group as consisting of named men who are the senior

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policymaking officers of the government. Both Presidents Eisenhower (in the U-2 case) and Kennedy (at the time of the Bay of Pigs) assumed responsibility and made the point that CIA operates within policy set by the authorized policymakers. A review of *The Invisible Government* in *Studies in Intelligence* quotes President Kennedy as follows:

I can find nothing, and I have looked through the record very carefully over the last nine months, and I could go back further, to indicate that the CIA has done anything but support policy. It does not create policy; it attempts to execute it in those areas where it has competence and responsibility. I can assure you flatly that the CIA has not carried out independent activities but has operated under close control of the Director of Central Intelligence, operating with the cooperation of the National Security Council and under my instructions. 6/

Basic Authority

The underlying authority for the conduct of covert action by the CIA is in Sec. 102(d) (5) of the National Security Act of 1947 (approved 26 July, 1947, which provides that the Agency, under the direction of the NSC, shall:

Perform such other functions related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council (NSC) may from time to time direct.

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This imprecise language was understood by the proponents of the legislation in the Executive Branch, including the President, and by important congressional leaders to refer to secret operations. It is probable that most of them had in mind espionage -- i.e., clandestine collection -- and it is difficult to identify those who include covert action. Some who backed the legislation, such as Dulles and General Donovan, clearly must have had in mind a full-fledged clandestine service. The subject, by its nature, was not a topic of open debate in Congress or of public record. The Executive Branch position was clarified, as a practical matter, a few months after the approval of the National Security Act.

The first NSC directive specifically ordering covert action was NSC 4-A, dated 19 December 1947.*

* Mr. Lawrence R. Houston, the General Counsel, recalls the circumstances which led to this important directive:

Mr. Forrestal, first as Secretary of the Navy and [later] as Secretary of Defense after the enactment of the National Security Act of 1947, had become extremely concerned about the communist activities
(footnote continued on following page)

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It related primarily to combating Communist propaganda in Italy and directed the DCI to ensure that his covert operations were "consistent with US foreign and military policies," a phrase which recurs in all the subsequent revisions and enlargements of the CIA's charter for secret operations. Any question as to whether the National Security Act authorized covert action was soon laid at rest by repeated NSC directives and by the fact that the appropriate Congressional committees, in providing funds for CIA, knew and approved the funding of covert action programs.

and potential for action in subversive operations around the world and had found no satisfactory way for the U. S. to combat them. After an NSC meeting in 1947, he asked Admiral Hillenkoetter if the Agency could undertake covert propaganda and related activities. Admiral Hillenkoetter asked my opinion, and I wrote him a memorandum stating that, while these activities were only related in a very general sense to intelligence affecting the national security as provided in the act, if we were given appropriate policy directives by the NSC and were provided funds for the purpose by the Congress, we had the administrative capability to undertake the operations. Admiral Hillenkoetter told Secretary Forrestal that we could do it, and this led to the development of the NSC policy directive.

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The first directive covering covert action in general, NSC 10/2, was approved on 18 June 1948. This document described in some detail the purpose of covert operations, all in terms of combating Communism and strengthening the non-Communist world to resist the Communists.* It was the basis for all subsequent NSC directives on covert operations, and for many years there was no essential change in the descriptions contained in NSC 10/2 of the purposes for which covert actions were authorized or in the provision that they should be carried out in such a manner that US responsibility could be "plausibly denied." What have changed are the various provisions which dealt with the means of ensuring policy guidance and policy approval of covert operations and coordination of such operations with overt US Government actions.

A word about these latter two points. Some of the ensuing discussion relates to the period before

* It is only in the 1969 revision that all the language about Communism was dropped.

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Dulles became DCI. This is because it would be misleading to imply that the problem was different during his administration from what it had been prior thereto or, for that matter, different from the present (1973) situation. The particular techniques or organizational gambits which were tried during the period 1953-61 are part of a continuum, and their significance is best seen if they are treated as a section of a continuing process. The formal establishment of an organization with substantial funds and staff which would in peacetime engage in secret political, propaganda, and paramilitary operations was a new departure for the United States Government. True, such activities had been engaged in by the United States in the past and had been extensively carried on by OSS during World War II. Such activities had been conducted by all nations to varying extents throughout history.

But what kind of control and guidance could be established to prevent US covert operations from making their own policy objectives and carrying out activities which might harm other US interests? An

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active organization under a dynamic Director might do so. In the context of an American psychology which reacted against secrecy, with vivid memories of what a secret police (Nazi or Communist) might develop in the way of power and autonomy if not kept in check, there was a wide-felt and legitimate desire to assure that CIA did not go off on frolics and detours of its own. Granting the desirability of assuring policy control over covert operations, how could it be accomplished? It did not take any high degree of cynicism, only a modicum of experience, to know that the likelihood of public disclosure of an activity was at least in direct proportion to the number of people who knew about it. Further, anyone would know that the US press, reflecting a deeply ingrained American belief, would consider a cloak of secrecy as merely an engraved invitation to penetrate and expose. Thus it was imperative to keep the mechanism for giving policy guidance to a minimum size and restricted to government officers trained and accustomed to discretion.

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A cognate, though distinguishable, problem was to try to assure that covert operations were consistent with open activities. This required more than policy approval, it was a matter of operating coordination. The various changes rung on the instructions in NSC 10/2 and its successors indicate the several methods attempted to achieve these two objectives.

Under NSC 10/2, the DCI was directed to assure that covert operations were consistent with US foreign and military policies. The provision regarding military policies was to take into account the fact that a number of covert operations, actual and planned, were paramilitary in nature or were designed to be in support of military operations in time of war. Examples were the organizing of potential resistance groups and escape and evasion routes for US troops behind enemy lines. There was a high degree of expectation that general war might soon break out, and in such event many covert operations would be adjuncts to military actions.

The responsibility was put on the DCI, and there was no provision requiring him to get formal policy approval. There was set up, however, a group

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of "senior consultants," consisting of representatives of State, Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of State, who met regularly with representatives of the CIA Clandestine Services to discuss covert operations, to arrange for support for them when needed, and generally to act as a review group. The men who initially sat for State and Defense, Robert Joyce and General John Magruder, respectively, had had long experience during the war and afterwards with secret operations and had the confidence of their Departments and access to those departmental officers whom they needed to see, and the system, though fairly informal, seemed to work quite well.

Psychological Strategy Board and NSC 10/5

On 4 April 1951, President Truman set up by Presidential Directives the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) which was charged with the

formulation and promulgation, as guidance to the departments and agencies responsible for psychological operations, of overall national psychological objectives, policies and programs, and for the coordination and evaluation of the national psychological effort. 7/

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It seemed logical that this board, which was composed of high-ranking officials -- i.e., the Under Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the DCI, with an advisor from the Joint Chiefs of Staff -- should coordinate major covert programs with the overt activities of the government.* On 23 October 1951 NSC 10/5 was issued to supplement NSC 10/2. It left NSC 10/2 in force, but it instructed that covert capabilities should be expanded and covert operations intensified. The order provided that the DCI was in charge of covert operations under NSC 10/2, "subject to the approval of the PSB," whose functions were to

(1) determine the desirability and feasibility of programs and of individual major projects for covert operations formulated by or proposed to the Director of Central Intelligence,

(2) establish the scope, pace, and timing of covert operations and the allocation of priorities among these operations.

* There was a permanent Director of the PSB, who in fact met with the board but was not a member.

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The PSB was also charged with coordinating action to ensure support for covert operations. NSC 10/5 also has a rather interesting philosophical concept embedded in it.

The National Security Council directs the Psychological Strategy Board to assure that its strategic concept for a national psychological program includes provision for covert operations designed to achieve

US objectives as described in that order. The idea of a "strategic concept for a national psychological program" does not sound like Harry S. Truman or his Secretary of State, Dean G. Acheson. Where this rather esoteric theory came from is a fascinating question. It did not survive the report of the so-called Jackson Committee in 1953.

This method of handling covert action programs, while it sounded plausible in theory, ran into the intractable problems which the giving of guidance to covert operations always faced. First, there was the problem of what may be called security. Those responsible for secret operations are extremely reluctant to divulge details about their plans or operations, particularly in writing. In part, this springs from a professional bias in favor of extreme

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secrecy. In part, it comes from the realization that only those fully trained in the maintenance of secrecy can be relied upon not to talk, not to let out little tidbits which a clever opponent or reporter can use to fill in uncertainties. Thus the Clandestine Services in CIA were most reluctant to expose to outsiders their plans and programs or to get them involved in a bureaucratic machine which inevitably would produce reams of paper.

One way to limit the danger would be to make disclosures only to very senior officials such as the full members of the PSB. This ran into another classic problem -- "great men" do not have the time or, in most cases, the background needed to go into details of covert action programs or to judge their merits. Therefore any discussion of a covert operation with them is essentially superficial, and their comments are guided more by their confidence in the proponent than by the objective merits of the proposal.

General Smith as DCI made an attempt to make NSC 10/5 work so far as consultation with the PSB was concerned. Realizing in time that discussion of Agency programs with the senior members of the

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PSB was largely a ritual, he established a procedure by which the broad plans of the various DDP divisions were discussed by an assistant directly responsible to him who met with the Director of the PSB and designated assistants of the PSB members. This group reviewed the projected annual programs of DDP, probably in the form prepared for internal budgetary purposes. A representative of the relevant DDP division participated in the discussion, answering questions and elaborating matters on request.

These sessions were not quite as futile as their description might imply because the men who first represented State and Defense were in fact the same men who had taken part in the meetings of the "senior consultants" under NSC 10/2, described above. But as personnel began to change, the usefulness of this procedure diminished. These preliminary meetings on secret plans and programs did not supersede action by the PSB itself; General Smith insisted that the principals themselves approve the programs. This insistence was not only to give the DCI the protection, such as it was, of

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the personal approval of the senior officials but also to form the basis for requiring from the various departments the help and support which was needed.*

* Much of the above material is from the memory of the writer, who served as General Smith's special assistant for PSB matters in the last months of 1952.

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Chapter 2

Operations Coordinating Board and NSC 5412*

Not long after his election in November 1952 President Eisenhower decided he wanted a thorough review of US Government activities in the field which was variously known as foreign information, propaganda, or psychological warfare. This was a period when the idea of "the battle for men's minds" was popular. Immediately after his inauguration, Eisenhower appointed a committee under the chairmanship of William H. Jackson (a former DDCI), which had as its members a number of men who, it was thought, could bring wisdom and judgment to a review of US informational activities for the new administration. Inasmuch as "gray" and covert programs in this field were included in the committee's charter, the group,

* While this discussion of the Operations Coordinating Board goes far beyond its role in giving policy guidance for covert operations, work with the board was one of Dulles's major assignments and it seems wise to include a discussion of all its functions in one place.

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known as the "Jackson Committee," was fully informed of many of CIA's programs, such as Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberation, the Congress for Cultural Freedom, and the like. The committee also reviewed the PSB -- both its mandate and its work. PSB was charged by NSC 10/5 with passing on the major projects for covert operations of CIA. To accomplish this, the board was to operate under a "strategic concept for a national psychological program [which] includes provision for covert operations designed to achieve the [US] objectives.... ."

This concept of a separate psychological strategy was rejected by the Jackson Committee. In its report to President Eisenhower dated 30 June 1953, it said:

The directive which created the Psychological Strategy Board assumes that in addition to national objectives formulated by the National Security Council, there are such things as "overall national psychological objectives"; PSB is indeed charged with the formulation and promulgation of these. The PSB directive also speaks of "psychological policies" and the Board has been working to develop "a strategic concept for psychological operations." We believe these phrases indicate a basic misconception, for we find that the "psychological" aspect of policy is

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not separable from policy, but is inherent in every diplomatic, economic or military action. There is a "psychological" implication in every act, but this does not have a life apart from the act...

For these reasons, we believe that the Psychological Strategy Board was improperly conceived and that it has not, under its charter been able to contribute materially to the national effort. We accordingly recommend that it be abolished. 8/

It was abolished. But the Jackson Committee believed that a coordinating body, composed of senior officers of the Government agencies engaged in foreign operations, should exist to ensure that the various departments were working together to a common end and that the so-called psychological factor was ground into all operations. The Jackson Committee therefore recommended that

...the President establish, within the NSC structure, an Operations Coordinating Board [OCB] to provide for the coordinated execution of approved national security policies.

The members were to be the Under Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Director of the Mutual Security Administration (the name of the aid program at that time), the DCI, and the Special Assistant to the President "for cold war

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planning." The recommendation was made that the Under Secretary of State be chairman. Gordon Gray, who was a member of the Jackson Committee, recalls that the committee really thought that the chairman should be the Presidential Special Assistant, since the board was to be within the NSC structure and one department should not have the superior position of chairman. He recalls that the Committee doubted, however, that General Walter Bedell Smith, who was Under Secretary of State, would in fact be content to attend personally under the chairmanship of C. D. Jackson, the Presidential Assistant. Accordingly, it recommended that General Smith be chairman. The Presidential Assistant did not become chairman until 1960, when Gordon Gray held that position and well after the time when the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs had become the State Department representative on the OCB. 9/

The Jackson Committee also recommended that those paragraphs of NSC 10/5 which charged the PSB with responsibilities in relation to covert programs of CIA be rescinded and the OCB be substituted in that role. In September 1953 the PSB was abolished

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and the OCB established by Executive Order. 10/ The NSC directive charging the OCB with responsibilities in connection with covert operations was not issued until the following year - NSC 5412, dated 15 March 1954.* While the role of the OCB in relation to covert operations was important to the DCI, it was not his only interest in its activities.

President Eisenhower had directed the stated members of the OCB to attend in person whenever possible and that the board should meet weekly. The President clearly intended the board to be effective by discussing the operations of the departments and agencies involved and producing commonly agreed lines of action to achieve policies set forth in NSC papers or otherwise referred to OCB. The DCI was a full member of the OCB, not just an advisor as he was of the NSC.** He was responsible for operations, primarily those of the Clandestine

* See p. 41, below.

** The Director of USIA was initially an advisor to the OCB, only becoming a full member in February 1955. 11/

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Services, and many of these operations were in the "psychological" field. Hence he qualified as a full member of OCB in both its main functions, that of coordinating operations and that of being responsible for including "psychological" consideration in the foreign activities of the Government. The process of coordinating his psychological operations with those of the other departments and agencies was in a sense tantamount to receiving policy guidance. It was for this reason that the OCB was given a role in the field of policy guidance to CIA.* (It was because many CIA operations were not primarily "psychological" in nature, that is, political action, and that other methods of policy guidance, that is, the use of

* A formal, and hence not very interesting, account of the organization and functioning of the OCB is to be found in an NSC document entitled "Operations Coordinating Board," dated February 1958 and presented by the then Executive Officer, Elmer B. Staats. ^{12/} A more detailed description, including organizational changes, is contained in a study entitled "Organizational History of the National Security Council," written by James S. Lay and Robert H. Johnson in 1960. ^{13/} Neither of these documents reveals the substantive work of the board or gives any flavor of its values.

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"designated representatives,"* were also available.)

Dulles took his membership in the OCB seriously and there is no doubt that the other members found him useful. His views as the chief intelligence officer of the Government were informed and were valued by other members in their discussions as to how NSC policies should best be carried out. Beyond this, he had available to him funds which could be used for unconventional purposes suggested by other members.

The organization functioned at three levels: the board itself, the board assistants, and the interdepartmental working groups. Necessarily, the members of the board could not personally see to all the multitude of subsidiary plans, courses of action, and other details of the Board's responsibilities. Each member therefore had a particular assistant, known as a board assistant, who looked after this activity for his principal. In addition, a large number of working groups were set up with representation from the various department and agencies

* See p. 60, below.

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involved. Although many of these working groups dealt with a specific geographic area (corresponding to one or more NSC policy papers), others were concerned with functional matters such as publishing, radio broadcasting, education, and trade fairs.

In practice, the board met first informally at lunch, only attended by the stipulated members, the Executive Secretary, and a few invited guests. There were no staffs present and the interchange was easy and undoubtedly useful. It was primarily at these lunch meetings that Dulles took up with the other members matters of CIA operations; it was here that the guidance was given for covert programs as required by NSC 5412. The plenary sessions of the board followed the lunches and were attended by staff assistants and members of the OCB staff. As a matter of experience, the usefulness of these meetings was largely a function of the attitude of the chairman. During the year that General Smith was chairman, many substantive matters were discussed, one department or agency would bring up matters on which it wanted the help of others, and suggestions were made of actions which could be

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taken to meet various policy objectives. Dulles was often asked whether he could finance projects which were not otherwise funded.* It is clear that although a good deal of time may have been unproductively spent by very senior officers, the net was probably valuable, if only that a practice of joint action was developed. The paper work of the OCB had not reached the blizzard proportions which came later. The practice of cooperation was reflected in the lower echelons of the structure -- i.e., among the board assistants and in the working group.

The role of CIA in this complex mechanism was somewhat ambiguous. Current and analytical intelligence was provided directly to the OCB on a timely basis by the assignment of a DDI officer to the office of the Executive Secretary. He made direct arrangements to get what was needed from the DDI. In most cases, the OCB mechanism through the working groups produced a proposed program of actions which

* Dulles's board assistant would prepare a report of the open meeting and what Dulles told him about the lunch meeting; this report was circulated to interest Agency components.

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were to be taken to carry out the NSC policies. These programs usually contained summary statements of the situation and problems in the country or area concerned. Comments on such summary statements from the positive intelligence components of CIA were provided to the CIA representative at the working group or board assistant level. (The DDI's office arranged for getting the comments of OCI, ONE, ORR, etc.). Such participation by CIA presented no particular problems.

Since the primary function of the OCB was to coordinate actions to be taken to carry out policy, virtually all the CIA representatives on OCB working groups came from the DDP staffs and operating divisions. When it came to action by the CIA to support and further NSC policies, a difficult problem arose. Clearly, security requirements and the basic instructions under which CIA representatives functioned did not permit discussion or even the revealing of what actions they would take. In practice, the CIA (DDP) representatives on working groups participated in the general discussions of the working groups. They then prepared for the DCI general statements of the

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action the CIA was proposing to take to support the activities of the overt departments and agencies. These statements, called "covert annexes," were in the hands of the DCI when the particular action program came before the senior board. The DCI frequently spoke at the lunches about actions CIA proposed to take, as described in the covert annexes, but after the first months, no written record of these discussions was kept.

By and large, the matter of CIA action to support NSC policies raised no particular problems in the OCB operation. True, various participants from other Agencies were often curious and tried to find out what CIA was up to. Others came up with what they thought were bright ideas for CIA action, but such matters were not too difficult to handle. CIA representation on the working groups did yield some positive benefits for the Agency. The mere fact that CIA officers were seen to be knowledgeable, agreeable people dispelled some of the mystery and allayed some of the suspicions of CIA which were prevalent, particularly among some Foreign Service officers. For their part, CIA officers took part

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in discussions of the subjects and areas in which they were interested and thereby acquired more information and understanding of what other parts of the government were doing and hence more ideas as to what CIA could do to contribute to achieving US objectives.

After a fairly good start, the machinery, particularly at the board level, became much less effective. When Herbert Hoover, Jr., in 1954 succeeded General Smith as Under Secretary of State, there was no longer a chairman who felt a special obligation to make cooperation and coordination work. That was not Hoover's style. If there was a need for State to deal with another agency or department, Hoover preferred to deal bilaterally without informing others. This predisposition of Hoover's was reflected in the actions of his board assistant, with the result that the meetings at the echelon below the board became more sterile. Another factor diminished the effectiveness of the board. The Executive Officer, Elmer B. Staats, was known as a bureaucrat's bureaucrat. It was apparent that he judged the effectiveness of himself and of his staff by the volume of paper produced. As a consequence,

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the progress reports, projections of future actions and the like became more and more bulky and the machinery became bogged down in paper.

The documents became much too voluminous for the busy men who were the board members to read. It is doubtful if any of them did read them; certainly Dulles did not. He relied on his board assistant to point out anything in an OCB document which merited his attention. His quick-witted way of handling such matters was impressive. At an OCB meeting he would say, "I think this is a fine paper, but perhaps paragraph 86a is a little ambiguous. Would it not better read as follows ...". The other board members (who had not read the paper) would agree. After the meeting, one board assistant or another would say to Dulles's assistant, "How do you get your boss to read these papers?" Dulles had not read the paper; the paragraph in question had been called to his attention by his assistant.

It was wholly unrealistic to think that officials at the level of the Under Secretary of State and the Deputy Secretary of Defense could involve themselves in details. A means for sorting out those matters

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which needed the attention of the senior officials was required. This was something that the board assistants should have handled. Some tried, but the fact was that in very few cases did the principals give any discretion or latitude to their assistants. Hoover's lack of interest in coordination or cooperation was well understood, and his assistant was bound by that. John Hollister, the head of the foreign aid program during much of the Eisenhower Administration, did not really believe in foreign aid and kept all the reins in his own hands, allowing his assistant to do nothing. Theodore Streibert, Director of USIA, also gave his assistant no leeway. The Defense assistant, William Godel, was preoccupied with conniving to advance his personal interest, which predisposed him against any give and take with his colleagues. Dulles did give his assistants as much authority as they would take, but he was almost alone in this.

In a properly run OCB, the plans should have been carefully reviewed by the assistants each of whom should then have forwarded to his principal on the board only those matters which were important

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enough for the members' attention. A more effective and imaginative executive officer would have seen to it that such a procedure was followed. But the executive officer, lacking vision as to the potentialities of the system, observed the limitations placed on the assistants and flooded the board with papers which were voluminous but essentially vapid.

Thus, during the Hoover regime, the niceties of interdepartmental courtesy made it virtually impossible for any one member or department to question another department's proposed action or lack of action. The operational plans were a compilation of what the various constituent agencies said they intended to do, and the idea of a lively interchange of ideas or the working out of complementary courses of action got lost in a flood of virtually meaningless papers. 14/

The whole exercise was not totally futile. Although the board assistants were not given the authority or backing to commit their departments and agencies to anything, they did discuss possible courses of action and by referring matters to their principals did influence the course of events toward a greater degree of cooperation in foreign operations.

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Likewise, at the working group level, the desk officers, the ones who had day-to-day responsibilities, engaged in interchanges of ideas and obtained suggestions for actions. The effectiveness of these working groups depended largely on the leadership of their chairmen, who were usually the State Department representatives. When these chairmen brought before their groups real problems and showed an interest in leading a coordinated attack, the mechanism had value.

The OCB was formally made part of the NSC structure by an Executive Order in February 1957. 15/ The principal purpose and effect of this move was in relation to its budget. From its beginning, two-thirds of the OCB budget had been paid by CIA and one-third by Defense, with State contributing administrative support. Under the new Executive Order, funds for the OCB were included in the appropriations obtained for the NSC.

After Hoover was replaced as Under Secretary of State by Christian A. Herter, in 1957, there was some improvement in the operation of the OCB. Herter wanted to make coordination and cooperation work.

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Although the staff still generated a flood of paper work, there was an effort to increase the effectiveness of the system. This situation continued after the Under Secretary of State was relieved of the duty of attending meetings and was replaced in 1959 by his deputy, the Under Secretary for Political Affairs. 16/ Later, in 1960, when Livingston T. Merchant had replaced Robert Murphy as the State representative, the Special Assistant to the President, Gordon Gray, became Chairman.

Although many of the old deficiencies remained, it is the testimony of those who were involved in OCB at that time that it did serve a useful function, that the lunch meetings were especially valuable, and that if OCB had not existed, an analogous body would have had to be set up. 17/

In 1959, the Senate Committee on Government Operations created a Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, under the Chairmanship of Senator Henry M. Jackson. Among the subjects on which the subcommittee took testimony was the OCB. The staff report, published by the subcommittee, concluded that "the case for abolishing the OCB is strong."

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Gordon Gray, who was chairman of the OCB at that time, found this conclusion very strange, for much of the testimony heard would seem to have indicated exactly the contrary. He pointed out, in a memorandum he prepared at the time, that the testimony of Secretary of State Herter had been selectively quoted in the staff report to include only those comments which were derogatory. The report omitted the testimony that the lunch meetings were "extraordinarily useful," that at times "pretty important decisions are made and made very quickly" at the full meetings, and that "if it were not for the OCB, you would have to have something similar." Gray noted that it omitted the testimony of Secretary of Defense Gates who had said that the OCB was functioning well:

I felt that the meetings I participated in were most helpful for coordinating the actions and implementation of NSC policies ... I think the OCB mechanism or something like it is vital to assist in coordinating the implementation of NSC policies.

Three witnesses who made critical comments -- Messrs. Paul H. Nitze, Robert Bowie, and General Maxwell D.

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Taylor -- prefaced their remarks by saying their information about the OCB was limited or second hand.*

Why the subcommittee staff took the negative view that they did is not known. Perhaps it was because OCB had gained the reputation of an impotent paper mill. It was, of course, powerless as a body, though the necessary power lay in the hands of its members. Its function was to coordinate, not command. This is the same problem that came up when the role of the DCI in coordinating the intelligence community was considered. As discussed below,** Dulles was criticized by the President and by the President's board for not ordering steps which would lead to more effective community action. But while the DCI has the statutory duty to coordinate, this is not the power to command other departments and agencies which have their own legislative authority and appropriations. In theory, the President has the power

* For excerpts from Gordon Gray's memorandum, see Appendix B.

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to give orders to the Executive Branch, but as a practical matter, there is a high degree of autonomy in the established departments. It was a failing of President Eisenhower, born of his military background and experience, that he thought that when he made a policy decision, along or through the NSC, the policy would be carried out by his subordinates in the Executive Branch. He lacked experience with the lasting power of the bureaucracy of the established departments which, if they disagreed with the policy, could delay, hedge, or frustrate to an extent not believable by one without long experience in government. Much the same may have been true in the case of the Jackson Subcommittee which may have seen the OCB as a powerless talking mechanism. This may also have been back of President Kennedy's decision in 1961 to abolish the OCB. The circumstances preceding abolition are interesting.

In 1960, President Eisenhower established the President's Committee on Information Activities Abroad, which was known as the "Sprague Committee" from its Chairman, Mansfield D. Sprague. Its function was to review the report of the Jackson Committee

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of 1953 and to see how the latter's recommendations had been carried out and how they had worked out. The Sprague Committee's conclusions with regard to the OCB were that

The creation of the Operations Coordinating Board in September 1953 represented a major step forward in improving the effectiveness of U.S. psychological and informational activities. Although the activities of the Board have been the subject of continuing debate, there can be no question that it has performed and continues to perform a number of vital functions in the coordination of informational activities and the integration of psychological factors in substantive programs of the Government

In the judgment of the Committee it is essential that, whatever changes may be made in national policy machinery, the functions now performed by the OCB continue to be provided for ... If the OCB did not exist, it would have to be invented. 18/

This report was submitted to President Eisenhower in December 1960, after the election of President Kennedy but before his inauguration. Two months later, a month after the inauguration, McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, sent a memorandum to the recipients of the Sprague Committee Report which said, in part, "The Sprague recommendation concerning

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the Operations Coordinating Board has been rejected by the President." 19/ Indeed, on 18 February 1961 President Kennedy issued an Executive Order abolishing the OCB. 20/ This action was consistent with the dislike which the Kennedy Administration manifested for elaborate organizational mechanisms, and its intention to have an enlarged White House staff take a much more active role in seeing that the President's wishes in foreign affairs were carried out. Specific White House staff members were given area or functional responsibilities; *ad hoc* task forces were set up when a continuing problem of coordinating action was recognized; and, in theory at least, Executive Branch officials, primarily the Assistant Secretaries of State, were supposed to keep track of and coordinate actions in their respective areas. The NSC fell into disuse and met comparatively rarely, and the OCB disappeared.

General Maxwell Taylor became Military Representative for President Kennedy in July 1961, and took over the chairmanship of the Special Group under NSC 5412/2. It soon became clear to him that some sort of mechanism for coordination of foreign

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operations was needed. There was therefore created the "Special Group (Counterinsurgency)" with members from State, Defense, the Joint Chiefs, AID, CIA, as well as the Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, a representative of the White House (McGeorge Bundy), and General Taylor as Chairman. Counterinsurgency was by no means limited to paramilitary matters; it included within its scope for this purpose a wide field of propaganda, economic aid, and even political action. Representation was at the Deputy Secretary - Agency Director level and the group played to some extent the same role as had the OCB lunches, although more operational discussions were made at the group's meetings. Dulles attended for CIA as long as he remained DCI.

It was not until the Johnson Administration that more or less permanent coordinating groups for the various geographical areas were set up under the relevant Assistant Secretaries of State.

NSC 5412

The OCB's mandate under NSC 5412 was somewhat different from that expressed in NSC 10/5. Gone

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were the provisions about "determining the desirability and feasibility of programs and of individual major projects." Gone was the provision about "establishing the scope, pace, and timing of covert operations and the allocation of priorities among these operations." The "strategic concept for a national psychological program" disappeared. Instead, NSC 5412 provided that

The members of the Operations Coordinating Board shall, under appropriate security arrangements, be advised of those covert operations related to National Security Council policies assigned to the Board for coordination or related to such other functions as may be assigned to the Board.

It also continued the by now classic language that the DCI should ensure

through designated representatives of the Secretary of State and of the Secretary of Defense that covert operations are planned and conducted in a manner consistent with United States foreign and military policies and with overt activities

This directive had the virtue of symmetry, it looked well on an organization chart, and for that reason fitted the predispositions of the early days of the Eisenhower Administration. Basic policy objectives were to be embodied in NSC documents which

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were prepared and staffed out in the interdepartmental planning group of the NSC. Once approved by the NSC, they were usually referred to the OCB to carry out, and the operating heads of the various agencies and departments met in the OCB to ensure that the whole Executive Branch worked as a team (a very popular word at the time) in step and harmony. What would be more suitable than that the DCI, to the extent that he was engaged in operations, should make use of this mechanism to ensure that his covert programs were making their contributions to the team effort?

The troubles with the system were just the same as those which arose with the PSB. In relation to important programs for covert action, the OCB members were in no position to judge CIA's capabilities nor, indeed, whether the results of a particular program were likely to be worthwhile. In the case of particularly sensitive proposals, many of the OCB members as well as the OCB staff and others who attended the board meetings had no need-to-know. Added to these inherent drawbacks of the system, there was the built-in reluctance of the covert operators, from the DCI down, to discuss secret

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operations in any sizeable group.

It was not all an empty gesture, however. Any matters which the DCI wanted to discuss with OCB members he took up at the lunches* which preceded the regular weekly OCB meetings.

When, as happened in a number of cases, the expenditure of a specific sum for a project was approved at an OCB lunch, the procedure in 1953-55 was for the Executive Secretary of OCB to circulate a memorandum to that effect to the full members of the OCB. 21/

The projects so approved were of a wide variety ranging from the provision of funds for several attempts in the early 1950's to evacuate Chinese Nationalist irregular forces from Burma (the so-called Li Mi forces), through compensation for a British ship destroyed by action for which the British claimed CIA was responsible during the anti-Arbenz revolution in Guatemala in 1954,** to funds for a State-initiated

* See p. 26, above.

** In fact, the compensation was never paid. Investigation showed that the ship was sunk by a pilot and plane furnished by President Somoza of Nicaragua. The owner of the ship still (1971) makes sporadic claims to the State Department.

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All actions were not approvals, however. For example, in June 1954, General Graves B. Erskine, who was sitting for Defense, referred to the desire of Chancellor Adenauer for some funds to use in an impending election in Berlin. Dulles said he knew of the request and, indeed, had had a note from the Chancellor. The record of the meeting circulated by Staats shows that the members of the OCB thought that responding to such a request would set a bad precedent, and disapproved of the idea. It is by no means sure, however, that if the same proposition had been advanced by Dulles with State support the other OCB members would have dissented.

There were no rules or general practices as to what would or would not be taken up by Dulles at the OCB. According to the NSC directive, he was to advise the OCB of certain covert operations; no policy approval was required.

NSC 5412 did, however, direct the DCI to consult with "designated representatives"* of the Secretaries

* See p. 60, below.

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of State and Defense to insure that covert actions were consistent with US foreign and military policies. It was this provision that Dulles usually interpreted as covering many specific projects and under which he usually acted in getting policy guidance on sensitive matters.

This requirement implied a more continuous consultation. Although, in fact, for years the State and Defense members of the OCB were also the designated representatives under NSC 5412, there was a distinction to be drawn between the members of the OCB and the designated representatives. In the first place, the OCB included, at its regular meetings and to some extent at its lunch meetings, other people, e.g., the directors of the aid program and of USIA, the OCB Executive Secretary, and various guests, some of whom were virtually permanent fixtures, such as Lewis Strauss, the Chairman of the AEC. In addition, regular OCB meetings were attended by a swarm of assistants and the OCB staff. Secondly, in their capacity as OCB members, the State and Defense representatives were present as the senior operating officials of their departments. This meant that they

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were prepared for the meetings by *operating* officials. As designated representatives, they were policy-giving officials who were prepared by officers who were concerned with *policy*, not the day-to-day activities of their departments. This distinction, which may seem somewhat over-refined, did, however, have substance. In essence, the designated representatives were supported in their policy-giving role by the staffs who were in intimate and continuing contact with the CIA Clandestine Services. They were prepared for meetings by these staffs and after the meetings, gave appropriate instructions to those staffs.

Thus while Dulles could have made, or tried to make, a sharp distinction between broad programs to be taken up with OCB and specific operations to be taken up with the designated representatives, he did not make such an attempt. What he in fact did depended much on his personal inclination and his feel for the most appropriate way to handle a particular matter. When he wanted to go to the Bureau of the Budget to obtain a release of funds from the Agency's reserve to meet unbudgeted expenses, he felt that the backing of the OCB gave his decision

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added weight and impressed the Bureau. Another type of case was when he wanted some support or cooperation from the overt agencies.

Other OCB members would make proposals or, in many cases, ask if CIA could covertly fund some project or program which they thought would be useful. Dulles probably found the OCB a fairly useful and helpful forum for discussing projects which were not highly sensitive. It also had the advantage, at least, of being a means by which he could gain a measure of interdepartmental blessing on some of his operations. Some of the proposals made by the other OCB members were, from time to time, useful, and the carrying out of these proposals gained a degree of backing for the Agency in high levels of government.

Planning Coordination Group and NSC 5412/1

In December 1954, Nelson A. Rockefeller succeeded C. D. Jackson as the President's Special Assistant "for the Cold War." His letter of appointment requested him to attend meetings of various interdepartmental groups including the NSC and the OCB. Rockefeller took seriously the words of his letter

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of appointment when they said

I [the President] shall look to you for advice and assistance in the development of increased understanding and cooperation among all peoples. I shall also look to you for assistance in reviewing and developing methods and programs by which the various Departments and agencies of the government may effectively contribute to such cooperation and understanding.

(Indeed, Rockefeller may well have written the letter.)

He obviously thought that the OCB would be a mechanism which could be used to carry out his mandate. But the trouble was that although he attended meetings, the Under Secretary of State, Herbert Hoover, Jr., was Chairman, and there was no love lost between them. Rockefeller was an activist, easily captured by what he thought was a bright idea, ready to jump into action on the spur of the moment and impatient of preliminary staff work. Hoover seemed to operate on the principle that doing nothing was always better than doing anything, that problems might go away if they were postponed long enough, that a quiet agreement or understanding with another government officer was the preferred way of doing business, and that it was unnecessary to tell anyone else about

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such agreements or understandings. While Messrs. Hoover and Rockefeller were polite enough at OCB meetings, it soon became clear to observers that if Rockefeller proposed some course of action, Hoover was almost automatically against it. This was exceedingly frustrating to Rockefeller, who had been told by the President to develop methods and programs to increase "understanding and cooperation among all peoples."

The following is speculation, but probably true. Rockefeller was much more interested in ideas for action than in the more grubby work of carrying the ideas out. Furthermore, he had no troops, in the sense of authority in an operating organization, nor money at his disposal. He probably thought he could, by setting up within the OCB a smaller planning group, circumvent the frustration which he had found in the OCB under Hoover's chairmanship. Out of this grew the proposal for a Planning Coordination Group (PCG), a part of the OCB, to be chaired by Rockefeller and to have as members representatives of State, Defense, and CIA. (He could be quite sure that Hoover would not consider personally attending

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meetings of a group under Rockefeller's chairmanship. He did not; the usual representative for State was Walworth Barbour, who was Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs.)

Dulles was not happy about this move. At his meeting with his Deputies on 25 February 1955 he discussed a meeting he was to attend that day regarding the proposed PCG. He said that several things were bothering him about the "charter" as then drafted. One was that Harold Stassen (then head of the aid program) was being removed from the group which considered CIA operations and that he had found Mr. Stassen "most helpful to us in many ways." He was also worried that the document as then drafted seemed to conflict with the NSC directives in that it gave the PCG responsibility for "detailed planning and approval of operations."

Nevertheless, on 10 March 1955, President Eisenhower established within the OCB a Planning Coordination Group (PCG) which was to concern itself with planning programs. Two days later, NSC 5412

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was amended by NSC 5412/1* which provided that

the regular members of the Planning Coordination Group shall hereafter be advised in advance of major covert programs initiated by the Central Intelligence Agency under this policy or as otherwise directed and shall be the normal channel for giving policy approval of such programs.

Nelson Rockefeller was designated Chairman of the PCG (and Vice-Chairman of the OCB) by a Presidential letter and was told to infuse the operations of the US Government with "dynamic new ideas." This letter, Robert Cutler told Dulles, had been drafted by Rockefeller.

So here was another, smaller, group to give policy guidance and also to give approval to major covert action programs. It had certain advantages over the larger OCB. The membership was much smaller and arrangements were made between Rockefeller and Dulles by which all records of PCG action on CIA

* A bureaucratic note: NSC papers were numbered according to their order in the year in which they were issued. When NSC 5412 (number 12 in 1954) was amended in 1955, it was a triumph of common sense over bureaucracy that CIA was able to have the amendment carry a 54 number. This was continued when the directive was again amended in December 1955.

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programs were to be kept in the DCI's office, the other members having only summary memoranda with a project being identified by a cryptonym. Thus the security problem was diminished. But the scheme did not work. The *sine qua non* of such a group was that its members be in a position to commit their departments both as a policy approval and as to the support they would provide. This could realistically be done only at the Under Secretary level, or by someone specifically authorized to do so by the Under Secretary. The representatives who attended the PCG, other than Dulles, were not so authorized and, as mentioned, Rockefeller did not himself have enough battalions. A Presidential assistant can be given enough authority if the President so chooses. Experience under later administrations shows this -- for example, McGeorge Bundy under Kennedy and Johnson, Kissinger under Nixon. But Foster Dulles as Secretary of State was the most powerful member of Eisenhower's cabinet. He had the President's full backing and no Presidential assistant had such status. Furthermore, Herbert Hoover, Jr., if only by reason of his name, had a position much stronger than

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Rockefeller's. The latter was no match for Hoover, and within six months it became apparent that Rockefeller would continue to be frustrated. By 10 October 1955, it was agreed that the PCG would be abolished, and the question arose as to what would succeed it as far as CIA was concerned. 22/

This eventually boiled down to whether the function of approval of covert action programs would be transferred to the designated representatives of the Secretaries of State and Defense plus a representative of the President (Rockefeller's first proposal), to the representatives of State and Defense without any Presidential representative (Hoover's proposal), or to the whole OCB (Rockefeller's second proposal). It should be noted that under both Rockefeller proposals, he would be part of the approval mechanism; under the Hoover proposal, he would not. The result was more or less of a fuzzy compromise.

NSC 5412/2

NSC 5412/2 was issued 28 December 1955. It provided that there should be consultation with and advice from the OCB. The DCI was charged with insuring,

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through designated representatives of the Secretaries of State and Defense, that covert operations were planned and conducted in a manner consistent with foreign and military policies and with overt activities. The function of policy approval was handled as follows:

7. Except as the President otherwise directs, designated representatives of the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense of the rank of Assistant Secretary or above, and a representative of the President designated for that purpose, shall hereafter be advised in advance of major covert programs initiated by CIA under this policy or as otherwise directed, and shall be the normal channel for giving policy approval for such programs as well as for securing coordination of support therefor among the Departments of State and Defense and the CIA.

This was the first time the designated representatives were given specific responsibility for policy approval. Thus in about four years, the circle had been completed; attempts to use some larger existing group to supervise the planning of covert programs had proved unsatisfactory, and essentially the situation was back to that under NSC 10/2 of 1948 except that a Presidential assistant was added to the designated representatives. They were given the responsibility for policy approval,

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and the group known as the "senior consultants" or "10/2 Panel" no longer existed.

Policy Guidance Through Liaison

There had been, however, a continuing process by which policy guidance and both formal and informal approval for specific covert actions was provided. As was proper and natural, most of this came from the Department of State. From the earliest days, there had been one, and later several, officers in State who were in intimate and daily contact with the Clandestine Services of CIA and who provided the principal means by which policy approval was sought and obtained. This function was first attached to the director of the Policy Planning Staff (George Kennan) but later to the Under Secretary of State, directly or through the Under Secretary for Political Affairs (at various times in the Eisenhower Administration this latter office was held by Robert Murphy, H. Freeman Matthews, and Livingston T. Merchant. In the Kennedy Administration, it was initially held by George McGhee.) The liaison office had sufficient status in State to be able to consult officers at any

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level necessary, and had the confidence of the DDP and other appropriate officers of CIA. Thus it was able both to learn about covert actions, planned and in process, at a time when policy guidance was most relevant, and either to obtain the guidance and transmit it or to put the appropriate officers in DDP and State in direct touch. Early in the administration of President Kennedy this liaison function was transferred in State to the Office of the Director of Intelligence and Research (INR). Dulles strongly opposed this, believing that policy guidance for covert action was not an intelligence matter but one which should remain with political policy officers. This opposition was unsuccessful, and the transfer was made. It is probable that the motivating forces in State were the ambitions of Roger Hilsman, the new Director of INR, and the distaste which the Under Secretary of State, Chester Bowles, and his Deputy for Political Affairs, George McGhee, had for covert action. 23/

The contact was by no means limited to the work of this liaison office; at various times there were periodic meetings, often weekly, between the DDP

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himself or one of his deputies or assistants and the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, or with Assistant Secretaries or lower ranking officers. This procedure was supplemented on occasion by written communications between the Agency and State, handled through this liaison channel and with security preserved by the firm rule that all papers were to be promptly returned to the DDP for custody.

That this system worked was evidenced in various discussions between the DCI and the formal "designated representatives" of the President and the Secretaries of State and Defense. It was commented on that the State representative was usually quite well informed about proposals, a fact that was explained by the effectiveness of the liaison between his office and CIA.

Liaison relations with Defense were not so close, nor was there usually a need for them to be so. The Deputy Secretary of Defense, who was for a long time the "designated Representative" to deal with CIA, handled the day-to-day liaison through his Assistant for Special Operations (for many years General Graves B. Erskine). But, with respect to

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the bulk of covert actions, which were not concerned with paramilitary actions, the role of Defense was minor; the important questions were those of foreign policy which were in the purview of State. Defense was important in those cases in which support was required, particularly in covert actions which were paramilitary in nature and in matters relating to planning for wartime. Since most of such support would have to come from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, there were officers in DDP who had established relations with the JCS organization and who carried on the routine liaison.

One of the main difficulties of liaison with the Department of Defense for several years concerned the man who handled such matters for General Erskine. This was one William Godel, a bright, aggressive, ambitious young man whom many in CIA did not trust. During the years when Frank G. Wisner was DDP (1951-57) he gave orders that Godel was not to be allowed into the buildings occupied by DDP (Temporary Buildings I, J, K, and L, south of the Reflecting Pool). Dulles did not trust him either.* After 1957, Godel's role

* It might be noted that Godel was finally ousted from General Erskine's office in 1957 and subsequently was jailed for misappropriation of funds.

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was filled by Frank Hand, a CIA employee who had spent so much time in the office of the Secretary of Defense and who was so acceptable that he was treated as a part of the Department of Defense. He kept the appropriate Defense officials informed of CIA operations to an extent which was quite acceptable to them.

The Functioning of the "Designated Representatives"

Although day-to-day liaison provided guidance from State, and to a lesser extent Defense, policy approval of more important matters was obtained or confirmed through the more formal procedures under the 5412 series of directives described above.* Most of the time these procedures took the form of meetings with the "designated representatives" which were usually held in the office of the Under Secretary of State before the regular weekly OCB lunches and meetings. These gatherings were attended by the DCI, the Under Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the President's Special Assistant

* See p. 41, above.

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for National Security Affairs. The only other person attending was the DCI assistant (during 1954-56, Wayne G. Jackson, thereafter Lloyd Egner and other officers for a short time, and then Thomas A. Parrott) who kept the only record. President Eisenhower had instructed that the only records should be kept by CIA.

The DCI would present a proposal orally, there would be some discussion of it, questions asked and answered, and a general approval. In many cases, the proposal would call for the DCI's seeking to withdraw funds from the Agency reserve, which was controlled by the Bureau of the Budget. It was understood with the BOB that any significant withdrawal should have the approval of the "designated representatives." So the DCI would take up the matter of finances at the meeting. As a practical matter, these meetings were quite superficial. The Under Secretary of State usually knew about the proposal through his officers who maintained liaison with CIA and had taken part in its development. The Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Presidential Assistant were given only a summary in general terms.

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As to the latter two, the exercise was to a large extent one of a formal vote of confidence in the DCI. Dulles was a past master at the presentation of covert action proposals. He believed in the efficacy of covert action; he was so transparently honest that his advocacy carried extra weight; furthermore, it was no handicap to him that during the many years of his administration his brother was Secretary of State.

The ensuing procedure was for the DCI's assistant to prepare a memorandum which in the most sterile language recited that a project known by a codeword had been discussed with the "designated representatives" and approved, and that, where appropriate, approval had also been given to the provision of additional support for the project. This memorandum, signed by the DCI, was sent to the "designated representatives." A detailed record of the proposal, bearing both the NSC 5412 cryptonym and the different Agency cryptonym, was filed in the DCI's office (after July 1956, in the office of the DDP). When withdrawal of funds from the reserve was involved, a memorandum was sent to the CIA Comptroller reciting the approval of the project, cross-referencing

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the Agency cryptonym and indicating the officer in CIA who could provide further details. The Comptroller took the matter up with the Bureau of the Budget, which released the funds from the reserve.

This procedure gave the DCI written evidence that approval of a specific project had been obtained from the formal "designated representatives" under the NSC directive. The filing of this record, with a detailed description of the project, in the DCI's office made a permanent record of the matter. Nevertheless, if an issue had subsequently arisen regarding the degree to which the "designated representatives" had understood the project, it would have usually appeared that in truth the State representative was the only one that had more than a sketchy knowledge.

A proposal for a preliminary staffing out of such projects with specially named staff officers from State, Defense, and the White House was suggested to Dulles in 1955. After this had been worked out in detail with the DDP, Dulles authorized a discussion of the procedure with State and Defense. 24/ The proposed procedure was relatively simple, merely providing that specified assistants of the "designated

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representatives" who would know or learn much about the realities of covert action would go thoroughly into a proposed project, subsequently briefing their principals so that a meeting of the "designated representatives" would be a gathering of informed, critical senior officers whose approval would not be given largely in the dark. Although such a procedure was approved in principle by the Under Secretary of State, Mr. Hoover, and by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Mr. Reuben Robertson, and by Dulles, it was never put into effect. When Wayne G. Jackson -- who had drafted the papers and seen to their approval in principle not only in CIA itself (and by the DDP, Wisner, personally) but also in State and Defense -- found Dulles reluctant to proceed, he had approximately the following conversation:

Jackson: You're not going to go ahead with this procedure, are you?

Dulles : No, and you know why.

Jackson: Why?

Dulles : Because Defense will name Godel as their man, and I won't have our covert actions laid out before him.

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Jackson: But you could easily say so to Mr. Robertson and insist that someone else be named.

Dulles : I won't do that; I've just been through the Trudeau affair, and I won't get into another personnel fight.*

Thus the rather hit-or-miss procedure of approvals persisted.

The next step occurred in December 1956 when the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities (PBCFIA) made its first report and recommendations to President Eisenhower. Their Recommendation No. 5 read

With regard to clandestine operations, we urge that present practices be regularized to insure that in all appropriate instances these projects (1) receive the benefit of proper joint staffing and formalized approval, and (2) that both the State and Defense Departments be kept abreast of the developments of these projects on a need-to-know basis and, of course, under tightly guarded security procedures. 25/

It is by no means clear what was in the minds of the PBCFIA in approving this recommendation.

* This referred to the controversy in 1955 which resulted in General Trudeau's being relieved as Army G-2 because of complaints by Dulles. See Volume II, pp. 126.

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Perhaps they were not convinced that the liaison between DDP and State was as close and effective as in fact it was. They seem to have thought that a more formalized method and record of policy consultation was desirable. It may be an unwarranted speculation, but the recommendation could well have been put forward by the PBCFIA staff, in particular Patrick Coyne, which wanted to have written records of covert actions for them to see. At any event, the recommendation was not greeted with enthusiasm by the "designated representatives" of State and Defense, who seemed to be quite satisfied with matters as they were. The PBCFIA recommendation was referred to the "designated representatives" for study and report to the President. In the spring of 1957, Dulles discussed with the "designated representatives" and with CIA officers the best procedures to carry out this directive. As indicative of the types of problems discussed, it might be noted that at the Deputies Meeting on 1 March 1957,

Mr. Helms asked the Director if any decisions had been reached at the 5412 meeting on 26 February. The Director

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said no final decision had been taken and that he and General Cutler had been asked to draft a paper setting forth the procedures to be followed in processing papers requiring action by the 5412 Committee. He commented that in his opinion a number of these papers did not require the approval and/or concurrence of Defense and therefore any procedures developed in processing papers for consideration of the Committee should take this into account. He said that Defense was fully in accord with this and only wanted to pass on those papers which would require support on its part.

There was one relatively important matter raised by the PBCFIA recommendation to the President when it referred to the "joint staffing" of projects. It was Dulles's contention -- and his colleagues, Under Secretary Herter, Deputy Secretary Robertson, and Presidential Assistant Robert Cutler, did not disagree -- that it did not mean that all the details of a project would be worked out together by the various departments and agencies. Rather it meant that

the designated representatives should have adequate information on which to base decisions Since the expression "joint staffing" is not interpreted in a manner inconsistent with my responsibility under the law to protect sources and methods, it is now clear that the intent of the recommendation can be fully achieved by a strengthening of liaison procedures. 26/

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One other matter bothered Dulles. He wanted it clear that once a project had been approved and was under way he was responsible for carrying it out, particularly as operating decisions had to be reached with speed. His continuing responsibility was to keep the "designated representatives" advised of important developments on a need-to-know basis. This was discussed at a meeting of the "designated representatives" on 16 March 1957, but no written record was made to indicate their agreement. 27/

The "designated representatives", Messrs. Herter, Robertson, and Cutler, with Dulles's concurrence, recommended to the President a procedure to carry out the intent of the PBCFIA Recommendation No. 5. There was nothing particularly startling about the procedure. When a covert project was submitted to the "designated representatives," they could decide whether they would act on an oral presentation, or whether they wanted a detailed written project to consider. In the latter case, such a paper would be handled on a "read-and-return" basis so as to assure security. CIA would keep State and Defense advised on a need-to-know basis about the carrying

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out of approved projects. In cases of specially sensitive projects which involved only foreign policy and had no military implications, the DCI could get his approval from the Secretary of State alone, reporting that fact, without describing the project, to the 5412 Group.* This was acceptable to the President, and a formal "Annex to NSC 5412/2" was sent out on 26 March 1957 by the NSC secretariat to the holders of NSC 5412/2 (a very small number of people) to be attached thereto. 28/

The PBCFIA returned to this subject when it made its third report, dated 30 October 1958 (but apparently not presented to the President until 16 December 1958). 29/ The memorandum of the Executive Secretary of the NSC to the DCI and the "designated representatives", dated 29 December 1958, says that the PBCFIA

recommended orally (a) that the Special Group, established pursuant to paragraph

* It should be noted that at about this time the practice was adopted of calling the "designated representatives" by the name of the "Special Group" or the "5412 Group." This was purely a change in name for convenience and involved no substantive change.

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7, NSC 5412/2, i.e., those that had theretofore been called the Designated Representatives, be instructed to assume responsibility for making periodic reviews and evaluations of significant clandestine cold war programs conducted pursuant to NSC 5412/2, (b) that a study be made of the relationship of the Special Group to the Central Intelligence Agency, and (c) that NSC 5412/2 be reexamined in the light of these recommendations. 30/

In January 1959 a memorandum for the record of T. A. Parrott says that weekly meetings of the Special Group had been instituted apparently as a result of a meeting between the President, Gordon Gray, and Dulles on 26 December 1958, and that the points raised by the PBCFIA were under active discussion. 31/ Fairly detailed minutes of Special Group meetings were started about this time. 32/ The whole matter was discussed at a joint meeting of the Special Group* with several members of the PBCFIA. Herter, speaking for State, said that he was quite satisfied that, through

very close cooperation and continuing liaison ... the objectives of covert projects are continually kept in line with policy considerations. 33/

* Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, John Irwin, represented Defense.

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As to evaluation -- Mr. Herter said this was very difficult due to the absence of clear criteria. For example, how can action to influence an election be judged, since no one can say what would have happened without the action. Irwin, representing Defense, supported this point on evaluation. Dulles said that he had been tending to make the weekly meetings of the Special Group "more of a forum for reporting progress," thus facilitating a continuing evaluation. It does not appear that anything in particular happened as a result of this meeting except that Dulles offered to have T. A. Parrott brief any Special Group member at any time. 34/

This subject of procedures of the Special Group came up again in various contexts. The basic problem always seemed to be that while the State representative believed that he was well enough informed through established liaison channels to act at Special Group meetings, other Special Group members felt they were not, although this did not generally bother the Defense representative. Neither he nor the President's Special Assistant had any arrangement for following covert actions, nor indeed any occasion to do so

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except that they were members of the Special Group.

In the early days of CIA, the relation with Defense had been much closer. At that time the prospect of general war with the USSR loomed large in the minds of military planners and an interminable length of time was spent on such things as the relationship of CIA to the JCS and subordinate commanders in theaters of active war, and plans for resistance and sabotage forces, stay-behind, and escape and evasion mechanisms. These plans, which have been characterized as wholly unrealistic (they were so characterized by General Smith in the writer's hearing), nevertheless were a part of the war plans of the military and formed a substantial basis for the continuing interest of Defense in CIA's covert operations. But circumstances changed. As stated in General Cabell's letter to the OCB on the subject "Scope and Pace of Covert (NSC 5412) Operations" in September 1954,

In the estimate of the present situation, the NSC papers conclude that US interests are endangered currently not so much from threat of direct Soviet military attack as from intensified Soviet political warfare to divide, subvert, and neutralize the free world by exploitation of instability and neutralism. 35/

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With this change of emphasis, the role of Defense in relation to covert action had become primarily one of providing physical support to operations which involved paramilitary activities. Nevertheless, Defense, and the services in particular, retained a keen interest in CIA and kept watchful eyes on its operations.

When CIA had been formed, it was charged with tasks many of which had been previously carried on by the services. OSS had, of course, been subordinate to the JCS during World War II and the earliest organizational units which succeeded it were likewise part of the Defense structure. The great bulk of the funds for CIA were hidden in Defense Department appropriations. More importantly, a number of the important functions of CIA remained of intense interest to the armed services and Defense. The interminable controversy over clandestine intelligence collection* is one example of the service interest in activities assigned to CIA. Another comparable

* See Volume II, Chapter 2.

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interest was in the field of ELINT.* The very legitimate concern of the Defense establishment in the early warning functions of CIA needs no elaboration. Perhaps of most importance was the direct effect on Defense, with regard to both its planning and its appropriations, of the evaluation of Soviet and other Communist military capabilities and intentions as stated in the intelligence conclusions of the DCI, notably the NIE's. The controversies over the so-called Bomber Gap of the late 1950's, the Missile Gap of 1958-61,** and, much later, the Tallin air/missile defense system are outstanding examples of the vital concern which Defense felt about CIA activities. The point need not be labored; when a military officer was DCI (Hillenkoetter, Smith, and Raborn), the DDCI was a civilian, and vice versa. General Smith had W. H. Jackson and Dulles; Admiral Raborn had Richard Helms. The reverse was that Dulles had General Cabell as DDCI; John McCone had General

* See Volume II, Chapter 1.

** See Volume V, Chapter 2.

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Carter; and Helms had Admiral Taylor, General Cushman and General Walters. The concept that Defense had a vital interest in the running and the activities of CIA was well established and wholly legitimate. To concede that Defense had usually only a peripheral interest in CIA's covert operations would have eroded Defense's position, and no one was inclined to try to do that.

It is true that President Eisenhower had views about Defense's relations to CIA's covert operations which were somewhat unorthodox for a military man. In December 1958, there was a meeting of the PBCFIA with President Eisenhower at which were discussed a number of recommendations which the board had adopted earlier that fall. In a memorandum from L. B. Kirkpatrick to Dulles covering this meeting on 16 December 1958 the following appears:

In discussion of Section IV concerning the focal point of liaison by the CIA and the Department of Defense on hot and cold war matters (non-intelligence), the President stated that he was in favor of the Board's recommendation that this liaison be focused in the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Mr. Gray [Gordon Gray, the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs] said he felt there were a

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lot of political matters that would involve bringing in the Secretary of Defense and particularly the Assistant Secretary for International Security. The President said he strongly disagreed and that if matters were political they were in the province of the Department of State and CIA. He said the Defense Department should stick to military affairs. 36/

It would have probably been logical to revise NSC 5412/2 in the light of this point of view to provide that policy guidance should come from State except in those cases in which there were military implications. But, in fact, the Defense participation in the 5412 procedure caused no problems and was certainly not worth a controversy. And there were, of course, cases in which there were significant military implications. A good example is the Indonesian operation of 1957, known as [REDACTED] which was taken up initially through the 5412 procedure. 37/

Generally, the Deputy Secretaries of Defense did not play an active role in such matters as policy guidance to CIA operations. An exception was Robert B. Anderson, Deputy Secretary from 3 May 1954 to

* See Chapter 3, below.

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11 July 1955, who as a "designated representative" and member of the OCB did actively participate in discussions of covert programs. It was even rumored at the time that the President had suggested to Mr. Anderson that he pay more attention to the Defense Department and less to foreign affairs. The Assistant Secretaries for International Security Affairs (ISA), starting in the latter part of the 1950's, served as representatives of Defense when the Under Secretaries did not attend Special Group meetings. These men took, of necessity, a greater interest in foreign policy matters, if only because military aid -- for which they were responsible -- was an integral part of US foreign policy operations. But no initiative seems to have been taken by the Defense representatives to arrange a closer relationship to the planning and progress of covert action. The Defense representatives did, however, admit that they had little or no preparation for Special Group meetings when the lack of such preparation became an issue with the President's Special Assistant who sat with the group.

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A representative of the President was first included among the "designated representatives" by NSC 5412/2 of 28 December 1955. At that time, Dillon Anderson, who was Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, was named by the President to be a member of the Special Group of "designated representatives." Why this addition was made is not clear. It may have been that President Eisenhower decided to reinforce the role which Rockefeller, and C. D. Jackson before him, had played as Presidential Assistants attending the OCB, and in the case of Rockefeller being Chairman of the Policy Coordinating Group of the OCB.* At any event, starting at the end of 1955 and through 1956, Dillon Anderson was a member of the Special Group. He was succeeded by Robert Cutler (who returned in 1957 to the job he had held from March 1953 to March 1955), who in turn was succeeded by Gordon Gray in July 1958. Gray held the position until the end of the Eisenhower administration in January 1961.

* Rockefeller had left late in 1955 and his post was not filled until W. H. Jackson became a Special Assistant in March 1956.

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Although neither Anderson nor Cutler seems to have felt the need for an arrangement for keeping closer tabs on covert action, Gray felt otherwise -- especially when weekly meetings of the Special Group started at the beginning of 1959. On a number of occasions he raised the issue, but no procedure was established. Indeed, the procedures under the Annex of NSC 5412/2, referred to above, gave him, as a Special Group member, a chance to request that a matter be submitted in writing, but he is not known to have done so, and the proceedings remained quite informal through the Eisenhower years.

One faintly amusing incident did occur. In September 1958, Parrott met, at Dulles's request, with Robert Macy, Chief of the International Division of the Bureau of the Budget. Macy was the principal staff member of the Bureau of the Budget to deal with CIA. Under the somewhat vague responsibility of the Bureau to oversee the organization of the Federal Government, Macy had alleged that various Special Group members were unhappy about their prior ignorance of matters coming before the group. In talking to Parrott, Macy said, according to Parrott's

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memorandum for the record, that it was the job of the Bureau of the Budget, and thus his, to "insure that actions taken by executive agencies are within the provisions of accepted policy." This rather grandiose claim was of a piece with Macy's general desire to find out about CIA covert operations to the greater extent possible. Macy suggested that perhaps he could serve Gray in his Special Group capacity as a sort of staff assistant who could be briefed and kept informed about 5412 matters. 38/

In a subsequent talk with Parrott, Gray did not take to the idea of Macy as a staff assistant and further said that

he did not agree with Macy's apparent contention that the Bureau of the Budget as an entity had a function of assuring the Agency's adherence to policy. 39/

At a later meeting, Gray said he had taken up with the President the matter of letting the Bureau of the Budget in on substantive discussions of covert projects. He reported the President as having said that

the Bureau of the Budget was *not* to render any judgment as to whether or not a project should be carried out.

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So Macy's effort to get in on the 5412 proceedings either via the Bureau of the Budget or as a staff man for Gordon Gray failed.

Gray's low-keyed sense of not being fully briefed persisted. He first suggested that Bromley Smith, a member of the NSC staff, assist him in this regard. This fell through when Smith was appointed Executive Secretary of the OCB to succeed Elmer B. Staats. Dulles then designated Parrott to brief Gray on the items on the Special Group agenda. This arrangement lasted during the balance of the Eisenhower Administration.

There were some changes when the Kennedy Administration came in. The White House staff became very much more active. McGeorge Bundy became the President's representative on the Special Group and decreed that copies of memoranda with full data on covert projects would be kept in his files. Parrott advised the DDP that he thought the kind of summary memoranda which had previously been shown to the Special Group from time to time would do. 40/ New Special Group procedures were set out when, in July 1961, General Maxwell Taylor became the President's Military Aide. Under these

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procedures, General Taylor became Chairman of the Special Group.* 41/ In fact, McGeorge Bundy had acted as Chairman since the change of administration, the Under Secretary of State being Chester Bowles who had a great distaste for covert action. The Special Group continued to meet, however, much as it had in the past. Dulles continued to attend meetings as the CIA representative (except when General Cabell acted in his absence) until 22 November 1961, a week before his formal retirement on 29 November. There was one minor formal change when General Taylor became Chairman. The man who kept minutes and was the "secretariat" was directly attached to General Taylor and nominally part of the White House staff, although in fact he was always a CIA man on detail.

Other Methods of Policy Guidance

These more or less organized means of obtaining policy guidance for covert operations were, of course, not the only ways in which such guidance was accomplished.

* The Special Group became known in 1964 as the "303 Group" or, sometimes, the "303 Committee" after National Security Action Memorandum No. 303, which merely changed its name but left intact the procedures under NSC 5412/2.

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It is certain that in a number of instances the basic guidance and often the impetus for an operation was given informally and at a high level. It would be too much to expect that Dulles would make a written record of his talks with his brother, the Secretary of State, and yet there is no doubt that in such talks, potential or ongoing covert operations were discussed and guidance given. For example, at the Deputies Meeting on 13 December 1954, Dulles

(c) noted he had seen the Secretary of State over the weekend and the Secretary had asked that CIA consider what courses of action might be open in the event that the Chicoms refuse to see Dag Hammarskjold....

(e) reported he had discussed with his brother over the weekend [REDACTED] report on Chinese overflights, and the Secretary had indicated he saw no objection to CIA continuing this operation. The Director said, however, he had informed the Secretary we would touch base with Walter Robertson [Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs] which Mr. Wisner undertook to do. In the meantime, the flights are to be held up pending Mr. Wisner's conversation with Mr. Robertson.

Direct requests for covert action also came from elsewhere in State. At the 28 November 1955 Deputies Meeting

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Mr. Wisner pointed out we have now been formally request by the State Department to step up our Latin American activities. Stated that Mr. Hoover [Under Secretary of State] said he would help on the budget problems.

At the 16 January 1956 Deputies Meeting

Mr. Wisner reported that we are still awaiting policy guidance from State on a certain operation in Laos

At the 15 April 1957 Deputies Meeting

Mr. Helms noted that we sorely lacked guidance on American policy in Africa south of the Sahara and had not been successful in obtaining any help from State. Action: DCI to mention this problem at the next OCB meeting.

Policy guidance also came from the NSC. At the Deputies Meeting on 14 July 1953

Mr. Amory [the DDI]: (a) reported that the question of policy respecting a Philippine election would be taken up at the NSC meeting on 30 July after first being considered by the PSB. After some discussion, Mr. Helms undertook to prepare a paper on this subject for the Director's use at the PSB luncheon on either 15 or 22 July.

At the Deputies Meeting on 28 February 1958

the Director stated that as a result of a full discussion on Indonesia at the NSC meeting on 27 February it was clear to him that this Agency has complete backing to go all out in furnishing assistance to the Indonesian dissidents.

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The Director said he in turn had made it clear to the members of the Council that in his opinion we had gone about as far as possible short of surfacing US aid to the dissident group in Indonesia. He added that upon completion of this comment further discussion was held and it was his understanding that even this eventually should not deter us in our efforts.

The Director stated, therefore, it was his desire that this aid be given number one priority

Policy guidance from the NSC was, of course, from the President, who presided at NSC meetings. Policy also came directly from the President, sometimes at meetings Dulles had with the President but more often when a matter discussed at the Special Group was referred to the President by his Special Assistant. There are many references to such referrals in the minutes of the Special Group. They are cloaked, a little coyly, under references to Mr. Gray's "friends" or "associates" or, later, "higher levels." It is clear what is meant and Parrott, who wrote most of the minutes, confirms that these references were to the President.

At the Special Group meeting of 16 July 1959, there was discussed the matter of supporting a

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middle-of-the-road political force in South Africa. This matter had been discussed at meetings in June and the State Department had voiced reservations as there did not seem to be an anti-Communist angle.

On 16 July

The Director said that he proposed to discuss with the President in about a week the proposal for political action in South Africa ... saying that he understood that Mr. Murphy [Under Secretary for Political Affairs] was prepared to join him in the approach to the President.

At the Deputies Meeting on 6 August 1954

Mr. Dulles ... noted we have a clear-cut mandate from the highest level to break up the Onassis combine and stated he wants to hit this case with everything we have.

On 23 November 1955

Mr. Dulles ... reported he had had a very good talk with the President regarding ... two very sensitive operations.

Other matters referred to the President included aid to the Thibetan resistance,* CIA investment in

* A subject in which the President was very interested, if one may judge from the number of items dealing with it which Dulles sent to General Goodpaster for the President. 42/

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an [REDACTED] airline* (Special Group Minutes, 27 January 1960), and Cuba (Special Group Minutes, 10 August 1960, and 30 November 1960). The Special Group Minutes of 8 September 1960 show that Gray thought that the matter of aid to the Thibetan resistance was so important as to justify having the Secretaries of State and Defense present when the matter was put before "his associates." At the Special Group meeting on 25 August 1960, it was clear that the President had previously (perhaps at an NSC meeting) expressed strong views on Lumumba, then riding high in the Congo. At that Special Group meeting Dulles outlined CIA's anti-Lumumba plans.

Mr. Gray commented, however, that his associates had expressed extremely strong feelings on the necessity for very straightforward action in this situation, and he wondered whether the plans as outlined were sufficient to accomplish this. Mr. Dulles replied that he had taken the comments referred to seriously and had every intention of proceeding as vigorously as the situation permits or requires, but added that he must

* Undertaken at the specific instance of the Department of State, which feared Russian control of the airline and asked the Agency to undertake a denial operation. The Agency was not particularly interested in the airline as such.

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necessarily put himself in a position of interpreting instructions of this kind within the bounds of necessity and capacity.

Reference had been made elsewhere to the account which President Eisenhower gave in his memoirs of the occasion when he met with Foster Dulles, Allen Dulles, and Henry Holland (the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs) to decide whether to arrange for airplanes for Castillo Armas, who was seeking to overthrow the Arbenz regime in Guatemala in 1954. In the *History of the Office of Special Activities from Inception to 1969*, 43/ there is reference to a meeting at the White House with the President regarding the proposed overhead reconnaissance program employing the U-2. It was attended by the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Air Force, the DCI and DDCI, the Secretaries of State and Defense, and General Goodpaster. General Cabell's longhand memorandum of the meeting stated

The project was approved subject to the reservation of the Secretary of Defense that a final look should be taken before the operation is actually launched, but after the material etc. are procured and readied. 44/

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While this was, of course, quite different from a CIA covert action program in the usual sense, the operation was at that time carried out by CIA (with substantial Air Force participation) under the strictest security controls.

Criteria for Seeking Policy Guidance

It is virtually impossible to derive from the evidence valid generalizations as to what sort of projects were put through the formal or informal procedures for obtaining policy guidance. It is quite clear, indeed, that there were no unvarying criteria; Dulles's *modus operandi* was not one of establishing criteria. At a Deputies Meeting on 13 February 1959 General Cabell stated:

it would be helpful to him and the Director if the Deputies, in submitted projects for approval of the DCI/DDCI, would indicate on a "blue buck tag" whether or not, in their opinion, the project should be submitted to the 5412 Committee. The Director agreed but made it clear that this expressed opinion of a Deputy would *not* become a part of the project action. He said while the advice of his Deputies would be desirable, the Director in the final analysis would have to make the decision, and he therefore did not *wish* to establish any written criteria

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for submission of projects to the 5412 Committee. He also noted, however, that the Annex to NSC 5412/2 does in general describe what type of project should come before this committee

This was an error, as the Annex did not describe what type of project should be referred to the Special Group, except to the extent that it permitted referral to the Secretary of State alone of particularly sensitive projects which had no military implications. The proposed operating procedures under NSC 5412/2 drafted in December 1955, and which were approved in principle in State and Defense as well as CIA, contained this language:

It is probably impossible to frame a definition of "major covert programs" which will be automatically applicable. A program which is of particular significance and importance may involve little or no money and be quite restricted in scope. As a working rule of thumb, the DCI would handle under this procedure (a) programs which are not covered under previous budgeting and which must be financed by a withdrawal from the CIA reserve; (b) programs which involve the expenditure of more than \$250,000 per annum; (c) programs which, in the opinion of the DCI, or of any designated representative under NSC 5412/2 whose staff has been consulted through liaison channels, are of sufficient importance to warrant the application of the procedure. 45/

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This procedure was never put into effect but the fact that it was approved in principle by the "designated representatives" in State and Defense indicated that it met with their understanding of the applicable criteria. A memorandum prepared by Parrott in January 1959, giving the background of the Special Group, 46/ used much the same set of criteria except that the amount of money involved was "usually over \$100,000." The criterion of withdrawal from the Agency reserve was about the only one which seems to have become firmly established. Another type of program which was taken up by Dulles under the various 5412 directives was one in which there would clearly be a need for support from other departments or agencies. It might be taken up either at the OCB lunch or with the Special Group.

With the establishment of the practice of having Special Group meetings weekly, starting in early 1959, the number of matters taken up increased substantially. This was not because different criteria were adopted but because there had to be something on the agenda weekly. As this practice grew, the discussion of covert action at the OCB

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lunches virtually ceased. This caused some concern to Gordon Gray who, at the 27 January 1960 meeting of the Special Group,

commented that some aspects of projects considered by the Special Group might not necessarily be unduly sensitive and that they might be of interest to the OCB luncheon group.*

Gray came back to the same problem on 12 May 1960, saying that

he was somewhat concerned about the effect on the morale of the members of the OCB luncheon meeting of the knowledge that the Special Group existed and apparently decided matters to which the OCB was not privy.

The others on the Special Group were not sufficiently moved by his remarks to do anything.

In those cases in which there was a special and continuing mechanism for policy guidance, as for example in the radiobroadcasts of Radio Free Europe and the NTS Russian exile station, Dulles saw no need for referral to the Special Group or to the OCB.

* The particular project he was referring to was a clandestine anti-Castro radio station. General Cabell disagreed regarding this project, pointing out that it was important that the cover of Cuban exile responsibility for this radio be preserved.

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There were also cases in which the policy was clear enough, but Dulles chose to mention operations to the Special Group.

At the Deputies Meeting of 17 June 1959, there was discussion of a project to print cheap books in [REDACTED] to compete with the books the Soviets were distributing:

The Director also raised the question of whether or not this particular project should receive 5412 consideration and Mr. Bissell (DDP) suggested that the Director *advise* the committee rather than ask for their approval. Mr. Bissell went on to say that he felt it would be well to keep the special committee informed of a number of our programs, particularly those not involving new policy and such others when we are in straight competition with the Communists and within our charter. The Director agreed.

There was one type of project which Dulles appears to have been anxious to discuss with the Special Group and other high-level government officers, and that was projects which involved substantial paramilitary operations -- particularly those of such scope that the concealing of the US hand might well become impossible. Mention has already been made of President Eisenhower's revealing in his memoirs Dulles's discussion with him of at least

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one aspect of the Guatemalan operation in 1954. Another is the program for support of the Indonesian dissidents in 1957-58, known as [REDACTED]

If the discussion of policy guidance so far has seemed to imply that it was the general pattern that policymakers enunciated policy guidelines and that the operations functioned merely to carry out those policies, it has been misleading. Such a statement of relationships is much too simplistic; the relation between policy and action is much more complex. Policy statements in a vacuum have no operative effect, it is only as they are embodied in action that they come to life, and of necessity most actions are in a sense a making of policy, if only a subordinate or derivative policy. In some important cases, the relation between the policy-makers and the operators is so intimate and continuous that the line between them becomes largely blurred. For example, General Hull, then chairman of the PBCFIA, was briefed on the extent of consultation and guidance in the Indonesian operation. The

* See Chapter 3, below.

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memorandum for the record of this briefing says that Mr. Ulmer, of the DDP, FE Division said

As the operation progressed, CIA obtained clearance from the State Department on every step, almost on a day to day basis Both Generals Hull and Cassidy [Secretary of the Board] were surprised at this statement but Mr. Ulmer explained that the risks involved were of such gravity that the Department desired to consider the implications of every action before authorizing CIA to proceed. 47/

The same memorandum goes on to say that General Hull remarked "he was disturbed at the degree to which the Department of State participated in and directed tactical aspects of the operation."

A policy decision or instruction can only be put into effect to the extent that the operator has the capability to do so. In 1954, an interesting paper discussing CIA's responsibilities and capabilities was prepared and sent to the OCB and perhaps also have been sent to the NSC. 48/ In this paper, the point was made that CIA had three main claims on its clandestine assets: (1) the collection of intelligence, (2) unconventional warfare support of the armed services, and (3) covert cold war operations. With regard to the third category, it stated:

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The essential basis for any covert operation is a secure clandestine apparatus which must include competent, experienced and dedicated personnel, adequate cover, and satisfactory operational intelligence and support. These essentials cannot be developed in a short time and are not to be bought by large appropriations. The undertaking of a covert operation without these essentials may be more detrimental than helpful.

This position represented a firm conviction of Dulles. It was for this reason that he insisted, as stated before, that he must have control and the power of decision regarding operational feasibility and the methods used to accomplish an end. Since his position was not seriously challenged, it follows that to the extent that operational decisions were in many cases tantamount to subsidiary policy decisions, the Agency did make subsidiary policy. This was not leveled at CIA as a criticism from informed sources. But this fact emphasizes the difficulty of any attempt to make a sharp distinction between policy and operations.

A recommendation might come from an ambassador that funds be provided for one or more factions in an election campaign. The genesis of such a suggestion might be impossible to discover. It could grow

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out of conversations between embassy officers and CIA station officers; it could have been suggested by either. Once the suggestion had been transmitted to Washington, it would be discussed between State and CIA at any one or more of various levels. If Dulles thought it important enough, or if it required tapping the Agency's reserve funds, it would be taken up at the Planning Coordination Group (PCG) or in later years the Special Group (SG).^{*} As the operation proceeded, it would probably have been discussed at the weekly meetings between the DDP (or one of his senior assistants) and the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, and at the meetings, often weekly, between DDP division chiefs and the relevant Assistant Secretary of State. 49/ The actual carrying out of the action would be in the field and would be handled by the CIA station in a manner depending on the assets and capabilities it commanded. Presumably the ambassador, whose formal request might have

* For example: France, PCG, 27 July 1955; Philippines, SG, November 1957; Greece, SG, 26 March 1958; Japan, SG, 11 April 1958; Pakistan, SG, 16 July 1958; and France, SG, 8 October 1958.

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initiated the action, would be cut in on the execution of the project.

In such a case, who could say where guidance started or ended, or where policy merged into operations?

Another type of case, and such cases were frequent, arose when, in discussions with State Department officers, at various levels, the latter would express concern about a particular country or situation and then, in substance, ask "What can CIA do to help?" The Agency would come up with some suggested covert operations, which would then be discussed with State. Either through informal or written exchanges, the project would be approved as in the summer and early fall of 1960 when CIA was told from the highest authority to do something to defeat the growing power of Lumumba. In Léopoldville, Mobutu was picked as a likely candidate to build up, and indeed he became the strong man of the Congo, probably responsible for preventing its total disintegration. It probably would have been next to impossible at the time to find out who had thought of Mobutu, and even harder today. But the suggestion of projects designed

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to counteract the worries of the State Department in a particular country or situation or the picking of Mobutu as the man to back are in a sense acts of policy -- certainly they have policy consequences. There is no doubt that in such cases the State Department would claim it had given policy guidance and approval.

Other cases are somewhat less complicated. When Radio Free Europe (RFE) needed to expand its radio facilities, Dulles took up the project with the OCB or Special Group, as the case might be, to get their concurrence to the withdrawal of funds from the Agency reserve.* The procurement and installation of the facility was handled by RFE, even though obtaining the consent of the government where a transmitter was to be erected might involve the US Ambassador and the State Department.

RFE is perhaps a good example of the different levels and occasions for policy guidance. It was set up in New York in the late 1940's, probably at the suggestion of George Kennan, when he was head

* OCB, 8 July 1954; Special Group, 29 August 1956.

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of the Policy Planning Staff of State. Its general purposes were established at that time. Agency responsibility started when the question of funding became acute, and CIA provided funds. 50/ There is no record, however, of any formal policy guidance from State to CIA through the more or less formal channels described above, as stated approval for expansion of facilities was given. Guidance to the RFE headquarters in Munich was issued by the International Organizations Division (IO) of DDP. When that division felt that it should clear its guidance documents with State, it submitted them to the senior officers in State concerned with Eastern European affairs, using the good offices of the regular CIA-State liaison mechanism. There was a close and continuing relationship between the IO Division and the political desks in State dealing with Eastern Europe. There was stationed in Munich a Foreign Service Officer whose sphere of responsibility was Eastern Europe. Attached to his staff was a CIA officer who had close liaison with RFE. Policy matters were discussed in that channel. At intervals, often twice a year, the US ambassadors from the

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Eastern European countries visited Munich and went over the past and projected operations of RFE with the Foreign Service and CIA officers mentioned above. 51/ RFE was a covert project, in that its principal financing came from CIA funds, although it was ostensibly supported by public contributions to the Crusade for Freedom.

In the fall of 1956, when the Hungarian revolt broke out, a number of low-powered radio stations in Hungary came on the air voicing the demands and telling of the actions of the rebels. These stations did not have much coverage because of their low power. They were heard, however, by the RFE monitoring installation in Germany. RFE cabled to CIA in Washington asking if they could rebroadcast the announcements of these local Hungarian stations on RFE's powerful equipment. Cord Myer, who was the senior DDP officer involved, told the writer that he consulted Dulles. The latter at once said that this was a matter of policy which the State Department should decide. Myer then went to see Robert Murphy, the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, who gave the go-ahead approval. 52/

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RFE was one of the projects in which Dulles was especially interested, as he was in the wide gamut of international organizations which were funded largely through the IO Division. These included such diverse groups as the Congress for Cultural Freedom, The Asia Foundation, a variety of Free World organizations of Women, Youth, Jurists, etc., and the American Committee for Liberation (Russian exiles who, among other things, operated Radio Liberation - now Radio Liberty). This was a time, it must be remembered, when the USSR was putting a major effort, and very substantial funds, into a wide variety of "front organizations" which were having a considerable appeal to the disoriented liberals and youth, particularly in Europe and in some of the emerging nations. Dulles felt strongly that the field could not be left to these Communist-dominated organizations and that a liberal non-Communist alternative should be offered. These activities were, of course, known to the appropriate officers in State; Dulles discussed some of them at OCB lunches. The public appeal for funds for the Crusade for Freedom was sponsored by President Eisenhower.

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In the case of many of them, CIA funding did not mean detailed control of their activities. Many had independent boards of directors (approved by CIA) who took some responsibility; some were virtually autonomous but were engaged in activities which were approved by the US Government.* In this category of cases, it is probably true that Dulles played an important role in deciding to what end CIA's influence on these organizations should be directed. It would be misleading, however, to speak of formal policy guidance from State or other mechanisms except in a negative sense -- i.e., that organizations whose activities were disapproved by the US Government would presumably find their CIA funds cut off.

A further point must be made. The main objective of these activities was to oppose those Communist-dominated organizations which were closely controlled, ideologically as well as operationally, and which followed the current Soviet party line. Opposition by its very nature would have to manifest diversity and differences of view and be infused by the concept

* An example is the Tolstoy Foundation which Dulles discussed at the PSB. 53/

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of free inquiry. Thus views expressed by representatives and members of the US-supported organizations in many cases were not necessarily shared by their financial sponsors. The representatives of US students who went to and spoke at international students meetings often voiced views which would not have been acceptable to the US Congress which appropriated the funds which made their attendance possible. It took a fairly sophisticated point of view to understand that the public exhibition of unorthodox views was a potent weapon against the monolithic Communist uniformity of action. There were plenty of people in the US Government, including the Congress, who understood this, and if it had not been for them, CIA could not have funded these operations.*

One other field of activity of the IO Division in which Dulles took a great personal interest was that of international labor. These operations were

* A full and detailed account of the Agency's activities in this field can be found in the document entitled "Agency Report to the Katzenbach Committee on the Ramparts Affair," 16 February 1967. 54/

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of great domestic sensitivity, particularly since CIA worked with and through both the CIO and the AF of L before their merger. As a result, special arrangements for their handling were in force and policy guidance and approval was limited to contact between Dulles and specified CIA officers, primarily in the IO Division, and the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, with the Assistant Secretary of Labor for International Affairs consulted on occasion. The normal CIA-State liaison, the OCB and the Special Group, were not, so far as the record shows, ever cut into these operations. 55/

The many programs and types of programs carried on by CIA during the Dulles years are too numerous even to mention individually. Separate histories have been written on a number of them, e.g., Guatemala in 1954 and Iran in 1954. Other programs are included in station histories -- e.g., Magsaysay in the Philippines [REDACTED] (to mention two of the most successful). The activities would also include a variety of proprietary organizations run by the Agency such as the CAT Airline in the Far East, [REDACTED] SEA Supply in Southeast

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Asia.* The specific programs which have been covered in some detail in this study have been chosen to illustrate the ways in which the policymakers of the government were involved in covert action and also because they were programs on which Dulles spent a great deal of time, perhaps a disproportionate amount. Those who during the 1950's had appointments to see the Director will all testify to the number of times they were kept waiting while he discussed details of his favorite projects with the operating officers from the Clandestine Service.

One more point might be made with regard to the seriousness with which the State Department took its role of guidance to and oversight of covert projects. Livingston T. Merchant, who was Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs in January 1961, made it one of his first orders of business with Dean Rusk, the new Secretary of State under President Kennedy, to give him a book in which were

* Separate studies are being prepared on them. The historical projects of the Clandestine Service should be consulted to find the coverage of covert action.

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described the major covert programs which were then in progress, calling special attention to the programs for Laos and China as situations which had very serious implications for the United States. Rusk promptly read the material Merchant gave him and then designated George McGhee, who was to be Under Secretary for Political Affairs, to make the monitoring of these covert projects his priority duty. 56/

There is no pat answer to the question of whether CIA made policy. In the sense that it operated within guidelines acceptable to State, and often with frequent, and sometimes continuous, detailed advice, it did not make policy. To the extent that its operations and operating decisions had policy consequences, it can fairly be said to have been a part of the policymaking mechanism. In the real world, simple answers can seldom be found to complicated questions.

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Chapter 3

Major Covert ActivitiesThe Indonesian Operation, 1957-58

The record is clear on the matter of policy guidance to CIA in the Indonesian operation. It was continuous, detailed, and probably merged into operational guidance. It is not proposed here to go into detail about this operation. It has been developed in detail as a Clandestine Services history. 57/

NSC 5518, dated 16 May 1955, set forth US policy towards Indonesia. It dealt with the threat that Sukarno -- the charismatic President of Indonesia, who appeared to be becoming more and more affiliated with the Communist powers, both the USSR and China -- might well be on the way to giving the Communists control of Indonesia. The directive approved covert action to prevent such control. By the spring of 1957, Communist influence in Sukarno's government was clearly becoming stronger, and certain military leaders in Sumatra and Sulawesi organized

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themselves in opposition to the Sukarno government, whose stronghold was on Java. These leaders sought US support and aid. By early March 1957, CIA formally requested in writing guidance from the State Department. State answered in writing. On 18 April and subsequent dates, CIA officers met with the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, Walter Robertson, and Ambassador Cumming (who had recently been Ambassador to Indonesia and was currently Director of Intelligence for State). In June, on Dulles's orders, General Erskine, the head of the Office of Special Operations under the Deputy Secretary of Defense, was briefed. On 1 August 1957, Dulles briefed the NSC on Indonesia

and all present agreed that something should be done At President Eisenhower's request, it was agreed that a group composed of representatives of State, Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, ICA [the aid program] and CIA, under State chairmanship, should prepare by 1 September a report for NSC consideration on the implications of the situation and possible actions. 58/

The Special Group, on 23 November 1957, approved the DCI's withdrawing from the CIA reserve the sum of \$843,000 for the Indonesian project. The minutes

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of that meeting referred to the special report to the NSC ordered by the President which was quoted as recommending that the United States

employ all feasible covert means to strengthen the determination, will and cohesion of the anti-Communist forces in the outer islands, particularly in Sumatra and Sulawesi, in order through their strength to affect favorably the situation in Java and to provide a rallying point if the Communists should take over Java.

Reference has been made above to the Deputies Meeting on 28 February 1958 at which Dulles reported on "a full discussion on Indonesia at the NSC meeting on 27 February." Dulles had told the NSC that "we had gone about as far as possible short of surfacing US aid." He was told that "this eventuality should not deter us in our efforts."

Under Secretary Herter took part in several meetings on Indonesia, and the Secretary, Foster Dulles, was also active. For example, in December 1957, when he had gone to Paris for a NATO meeting, he talked to British Prime Minister Macmillan and Foreign Secretary Lloyd regarding British cooperation in anti-Sukarno action, 59/ and in March 1958 he talked to President Chiang Kai-shek in Taipei about

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the need to give the dissidents help. 60/ In March 1958 the Secretary of State authorized the stationing of combat aircraft near the area. 61/

Consultation was by no means limited to the State Department. On 31 March 1958, Dulles briefed the IAC in considerable detail, 62/ and on 4 April the Joint Chiefs of Staff and others in Defense were briefed by a CIA delegation. At this last meeting, Assistant Secretary of Defense John Irwin (who often sat on 5412 matters for Defense)

observed that the action of CIA so far had been in keeping with current policy as set by the Department of State At the close of the discussion, General Eddleman inquired whether it was necessary for CIA to obtain Department of State clearance for each operation. The DDCI replied that the Department had been consulted at a high level on a step-by-step basis and had specifically approved each move CIA had made in support of the Revolutionary Government. 63/

It is unnecessary here to go on with the innumerable meetings at which the Indonesian operation was discussed. Additional approvals for withdrawal of funds from the CIA reserve were given by the Special Group. The whole matter was discussed at the NSC. 64/ On 8 April 1958, General Cabell flew

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to Honolulu to brief CINCPAC and others. 65/ Lieutenant General Earl W. Barnes, Ret., was at the time a member of the Board of National Estimates. He was loaned to the operation as an advisor. It is his testimony to the writer that he was present at a number of meetings in which the Secretary of State, Foster Dulles, took part and that the Secretary was very actively involved, making in many instances decisions "as if he were the case officer." 66/

The dissidents in Indonesia, however, fell apart when Sukarno's central government moved against them. They showed no apparent ability or inclination to fight to defend their positions, and it became clear in Washington that the operation had achieved no success. Dulles was instructed, probably by the President, to end aid to the dissidents. Whatever his personal inclinations, he did so, sending a message which concluded:

This is the most difficult message I have ever sent. It is sent only under impelling necessity and in what we all view here as the highest national interest. We rely upon you to carry it out with the same loyalty and skill that you have shown in your most difficult assignment. 67/

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This message was to the remaining CIA team in Sulawesi, instructing them to evacuate, which they did by submarine.

The purpose of this recitation has been to show the involvement of the State and Defense Departments and the White House in the planning, conduct, and termination of this major paramilitary project.

This certainly was not a typical case. It involved not only political action, but also military support of a revolt requiring the clandestine delivery of substantial quantities of arms and equipment, the use of military aircraft, support from the armed services, consultation with the governments of the United Kingdom, the Philippines, and Nationalist China. The one thing that can be said with certainty is that the injunction that covert actions should be planned and conducted in a manner consistent with US foreign and military policies was fully observed.

The Bay of Pigs

The most elaborate, and of course the most notorious, paramilitary operation planned and launched as a covert project during Dulles's

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directorship was the 1961 operation against Castro in Cuba, which is known by the name of the Bay of Pigs. This history will confine itself to considering the matter of policy guidance for this operation and will comment on some of the assessments of it in which the US Government had a hand.

The story of Castro's early life, his plots against the Batista regime in Cuba, his landing in Cuba with a small band of revolutionaries, and his overthrow of the Batista regime in 1959 have been covered extensively. As could be expected, his movements and the situation in Cuba were included continuously in intelligence issuances of CIA. As his growing movement towards embracing the Communists proceeded, the political hue of the Castro regime and its prospects were considered in a number of National Intelligence Estimates. This account treats the period after Castro had openly embraced the Soviet Union and was receiving Soviet arms and supplies and after the decision had been reached in the US Government that economic sanctions and covert subversion would not bring down Castro and that

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more direct means would have to be considered and probably tried.

The operation, which was directed by CIA, involved the recruiting, training, and management of an invasion force that was to land in Cuba to serve as a rallying point for those disaffected by the Castro regime and as the basis for the establishment in Cuba of an anti-Castro government which could be overtly recognized and supported by the United States. The name Bay of Pigs came from the local name of the eventual landing place.

An examination of the record makes it clear that at all phases of the operation from the start of planning to its conclusion, there was full and continuous consultation between CIA and the relevant parts of the government. The minutes of the Special Group meetings during most of 1960 show that Cuba was a constant topic. A number of meetings dealt with nothing else. Parrott testifies that he was instructed by Dulles to attend the very frequent meetings in CIA dealing with the planning and preparatory stages so as to be able to report fully to

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the Special Group as its weekly meetings, and that he did so report.

Various persons who had a special interest in the Cuban operation attended Special Group meetings on a number of occasions. For example, the meeting on 15 March 1960 was exclusively on Cuba and was attended by Admiral Burke (Chief of Naval Operations), and Roy Rubottom (Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs) as well as Richard M. Bissell, Jr. (DDP), and Colonel J. C. King (Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division, DDP). On 14 July 1960, at a Special Group meeting,

Mr. Bissell covered various details of the paramilitary aspect of JMARC, with particular emphasis on air support. Mr. James H. Douglas [Deputy Secretary of Defense] agreed in principle with the idea of Navy support for the air program, and with the basic concept that an air capability would almost certainly be required if overall plans develop as anticipated

On 10 August 1960, C. Tracy Barnes (of DDP)

gave a brief progress report covering the status of sabotage plans, paramilitary training, preparation for air support and the propaganda program with particular reference to Swan Island.

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On 19 November 1960, Douglas said that

he felt also that the US capability for intervention in Cuba will probably not be effective enough unless there is more overt participation than has been contemplated to date. General Lansdale said that he and General Bonesteel were of the same opinion.

At the same meeting,

Mr. Dulles and Mr. Bissell told the group about their briefing of Senator Kennedy [the President-elect] the day before. Mr. Dulles said that in addition to briefings on specific areas, he had gone into the basic authority of the Special Group

Dulles's own account of this briefing is contained in a memorandum sent to General Taylor on 1 June 1961.

On Friday, 18 November 1960, Mr. Bissell and I briefed the President-elect at Palm Beach, Florida. This briefing included a status report with respect to certain important covert operations and in particular the Cuban operation. The particular purpose of the briefing was to bring the President-elect up to date with regard to the policy paper on Cuba which had been approved by the President on 16 March 1960 and to outline the progress which had been made toward accomplishing the aforementioned objectives set out in that paper, all of which called for action in the covert field.

It seemed important to advise the President-elect of these facts since he

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was receiving a large number of suggestions and was under considerable pressure from certain Congressional leaders who were not aware of the action programs which were being developed in the Cuban situation.

The purpose of the briefing was not to solicit the President-elect's approval or disapproval of the program but merely to acquaint him of its existence. 68/

The policy paper referred to was a SECRET/Eyes Only "Program of covert Action vs. the Castro Regime" which was presented to and approved by President Eisenhower on 17 March 1960. 69/ Gordon Gray, President Eisenhower's Special Assistant, was present at this meeting and made it clear that the President did not then, or at any later time, approve more than planning and preparation for the invasion. He did not, prior to the end of his Administration on 20 January 1961, approve the actual carrying out of the invasion attempt.

At the 30 November 1960 meeting of the Special Group,

Mr. Gray solicited the Group's assistance in arriving at a consensus of views as to what exactly had been decided as a result of the high-level meeting of the day before.

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That this refers to a meeting with President Eisenhower on the Cuba project is a conclusion to be drawn from Gray's reference to the desires of "his friend," a circumlocution for the President.

Dulles also briefed the subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee that dealt with CIA affairs. On 10 March 1961 he appeared before them with General Cabell. An excerpt from a memorandum which Dulles sent to General Taylor on 9 May 1961 quotes part of his testimony:

Mr. Dulles: About a year ago, decision was made in the high political level that Cuba had passed the point of no return, that it was a Communist dominated society that they were trying to extend their Communist revolution to neighboring countries, particularly in the Caribbean area, and therefore we were asked to start to develop, working covertly, a force in being of Cubans and a political organization of Cubans and a propaganda attack on Communism in Cuba.... 70/

After describing the propaganda apparatus, including the [REDACTED] radio, and the attempts to get the various Cuban exile groups together, Dulles asked General Cabell to outline the military and paramilitary part of the program. General Cabell told about the 1,000 or so Cubans training in

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Guatemala, the training and operations of an air arm, and the establishment of a maritime capability.

After the inauguration of President Kennedy, there was no mention of Cuba in the minutes of the Special Group until after the Bay of Pigs debacle. The explanation is that the planning and review of plans were taken on by other very high-level groups. At President Kennedy's instruction, the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Attorney General (Robert F. Kennedy) were briefed by Dulles and Bissell two days after the inauguration on 20 January 1961. Thereafter, there were a number of meetings with the President, the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Chairman of the JCS, the Attorney General, and Dulles present. Bundy and Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., of the White House staff were also included as well as Assistant Secretaries from State and Defense. There were seven such meetings between 28 January and 12 April. 71/ A task force had been set up by agreement between the Secretaries of State and Defense and the DCI to deal virtually on a continuing basis with the operation. The task force, which had

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representatives from State, Defense, and the JCS, as well as CIA, came into existence before the inauguration and continued after it. In addition to these mechanisms, various matters were discussed with the President directly. For example, on 11 March, the President, on recommendation of the State Department, vetoed the idea that the invasion should take place at Trinidad in central Cuba, the site preferred by the JCS. 72/

The question of when or whether a clear-cut decision to go ahead with the invasion was made by President Kennedy is hard to answer. It appears that he approved continuation of the planning and preparation while reserving the right to abort the whole affair. At various meetings with him there were presented planning papers, each embodying changes since the last planning paper. 73/ The last such paper was dated 12 April 1961; 74/ the invasion landing was the night of the 16th. The President was told that the last hour for canceling the invasion was 1200, 16 April. Shortly after 1200 that day, the DDP checked with McGeorge Bundy and "no diversion being ordered, authorized the landing to proceed." 75/

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It seems that a project which had started as a plan which might or might not be put into effect, gradually became a program with such a momentum of its own that only a drastic decision would halt it. It could hardly be otherwise when more than 1,500 men had been recruited, armed, trained, and encouraged to invade; a coalition of exiled leaders had been merged into a body expecting to become a rival government of Cuba; and arms, ships, and equipment had been procured. But the fact that the President reserved the right to cancel can only mean that he, and his advisers, knew that unless there was a cancellation, the invasion attempt would go forward. Thus it seems rather academic to enquire whether there was a clear-cut decision to go forward; there was undoubtedly a decision not to stop the program.

The involvement of the highest levels of policy-makers did not stop when the military action had started. When it came to the crucial decisions on airstrikes on D-Day, the decisions were made by the Secretary of State in consultation with the President. Many believe that the crucial decision was that of the President when he vetoed the second strike against

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Cuban airfields. The strike was designed to destroy those planes left to Castro after the first strike on D minus 2. It was these remaining planes which caused such havoc among the ships supporting the invasion forces, depriving them of ammunition and fuel and thus of the means for carrying on the fighting.

The President and Rusk were under great pressure not to allow the US hand to show more than it had already shown. Adlai Stevenson, at the UN, was trying to uphold the US position that the whole affair was run by Cuban exiles. He was very upset that he had not been told the whole truth of the matter, and said that the US position could not be maintained there if there was a strike which obviously came from outside Cuba. There was no doubt that those in charge of the operation, both from Defense and CIA, had long been convinced that air power in Castro's hands could be fatal to the invasion attempt. The references to Special Group meetings above make this clear. Some time before the invasion, retired Lieutenant General Earl W. Barnes, then a member of the Board of National Estimates, and Vice-Admiral Jerauld Wright, also a Board member, were briefed in detail

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on the invasion plans. Barnes told the writer that he specifically stressed the essentiality of total air superiority. Thus the decision to refuse a second airstrike against Castro's planes was of major importance. When the word came to General Cabell, Acting Director in Dulles's absence, from McGeorge Bundy that the second strike would not be permitted, Cabell and Bissell went to see Secretary of State Rusk to urge a reversal of the decision, making it clear that in their opinion the success of the enterprise was seriously jeopardized by such a decision. Rusk, according to Cabell, agreed that strikes could be made in the immediate beachhead area but not against Cuban airfields, a harbor, or a broadcasting station. It does not appear from Cabell's memorandum describing this meeting whether Rusk then consulted the President. 76/ Cabell told the writer in 1970 that Rusk did consult the President at that time by telephone, and Bissell confirmed this to the writer in 1971. Rusk's speaking to the President, who was at the time at his Virginia home, is consistent with what happened next, which is that Rusk asked Cabell whether he would like to speak

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personally to the President. Cabell saw no point in doing so, and Bissell agreed. Both said that if Rusk had not spoken to the President at that time and had not relayed the Cabell-Bissell views of the consequences of not neutralizing the Castro airforce, either Cabell or Bissell would have spoken to the President.

Cabell has been criticized for not speaking to the President, and he made it clear to the writer in 1970 that in retrospect he regretted not having done so. This regret was at not having made the gesture; he did not think that Kennedy would have reversed his decision. The writer was informed by Bissell in 1971 that when General Maxwell Taylor reported orally to President Kennedy on his investigation of the Cuban operation (that report is discussed below), he was critical of Cabell for not having brought personally to the President's attention the military consequences of the failure to attack the airfields. The Inspector General's survey of the Cuban operation (discussed below) was critical of the way the seriousness of the cancellation of the second airstrike was presented, or not presented, to the President. Since, however, the authors of the survey did not consult

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Cabell or Bissell or anyone outside the Agency and since Cabell wrote a detailed memorandum describing the events shortly after they happened, the account of Cabell and of Bissell must be taken as accurate and the IG's criticisms taken as based on faulty evidence.

Later on the same day, Cabell arranged with the Navy to have planes on the carrier *Essex*, which was off shore, ready to give cover to the ships withdrawing from the beachhead. He called Rusk to ask permission for such cover. Rusk called the President and put Cabell on the phone. After Cabell made the request to the President, the latter talked to Rusk, who told Cabell that the request for air cover was disapproved. This was after the Castro planes had done the damage to the invading forces and their supporting ships.

Dulles has been criticized for not being in Washington at the time of the invasion. He was in Puerto Rico giving a speech. He had been scheduled to give the speech the year before but had had to cancel it. He had made the second commitment long before the exact timing of the invasion was set and

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he was most reluctant to cancel again. He also believed, the writer has been informed by Bissell, that his being out of the country might lend credence to the story that the invasion was an all-Cuban affair. He had, of course, been intimately connected with the planning and in the discussions with policymakers, including both Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy, as the above account of policy guidance demonstrates. It is highly unlikely that his presence in Washington would have made any difference, although in hindsight there is the appearance of the captains's not being on the bridge at the time of a major engagement.

Thus the record is clear that the planning and indeed the execution of the Cuban operations was with the full participation of the policymakers of the US Government. And no policymaker has claimed the contrary. It is true that various people have claimed that they were not told all the relevant facts, that they were not made to understand the implications of certain proposed actions. But such remarks are hardly surprising in a case which was looked on as a minor national disaster and in a

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situation in which many people were trying to protect the image of President Kennedy.

Assessments of the Bay of Pigs Operation

The Inspector General's Survey. Dulles, immediately after the failure, directed the Inspector General, Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, to prepare a survey on the Cuban operation. Kirkpatrick did so with the aid of a few members of his staff. This survey was completed in October 1961, after John A. McCone had been announced as the new DCI, but before 29 November, when he took office. On 20 November Kirkpatrick delivered a copy of the survey to McCone, but did not give a copy to Dulles, Cabell, or Bissell. Dulles did not know that the survey had been completed until McCone mentioned it to him. Dulles at once instructed his Executive Officer, J. S. Earman, to get four copies from Kirkpatrick and give one to him, one to Cabell, one to Bissell, and to keep one for himself. 77/ Why a report dated October was given to no one until 20 November is an intriguing question. Possibly it was dated as of the time the substantive work was

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done and it took three weeks to type, but this seems unlikely.

The IG's survey is a document of 170 pages, with 5 annexes totaling 14 pages. It states in its introduction that its purpose is to

evaluate selected aspects of the Agency's performance ... to describe weaknesses and failures ... and to make recommendations for their correction and avoidance in the future.

It is obviously not possible to summarize its findings in a short compass. Suffice it to say for the purposes of this history that the survey was highly critical (1) of the organization in DDP for handling this project, (2) of the relation of DDP to other parts of the Agency, (3) of the personnel involved, and (4) of the failure to have a procedure to make "cold, hard appraisals at recurring intervals of the chances of success of major covert projects ..." and to communicate these appraisals and estimates by the Board of National Estimates "or other body similarly divorced from clandestine operations" to the makers of national policy. It also criticized the lack of "a mechanism ... to communicate to the Agency the national policy bearing on such projects"

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and urged that "the Agency should not undertake action until clearly defined policy has been received." The survey said that in its preparation "about 125 Agency employees of all levels" had been interviewed and a large quantity of documentary material studied.

After reading the survey, Dulles wrote a memorandum to McCone and so did Cabell. The DDP wrote an analysis of the survey dated 18 January 1962 which totaled 170 pages plus annexes.

Dulles's memorandum to McCone, dated 15 February 1962, 78/ was temperate in tone considering how angry he was that the survey, which he had ordered and which was completed a month before he retired as DCI, had not been delivered to him, the DCI, but to his named successor. He mentioned that the comments of Cabell and of Bissell had already been sent to McCone. For his part, he said

The Inspector General's report suffers from the fact that his investigation was limited to the activities of one segment of one agency, namely the CIA. Opinions based on such a partial review fail to give the true story or to provide a sound basis for the sweeping conclusions reached by him.

Judgments could not properly be rendered in this matter without a full analysis,

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as made by the Taylor Committee [discussed below] of actions of all of the participating elements in the operation and the influences brought to bear outside of the Agency which affected the operation. This applies particularly to the participation of the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to certain elements of the Executive Department of the Government.

At no time during the preparation of his report did the Inspector General request any information from me and he makes certain serious errors in areas where my direct responsibility was clearly involved.

Dulles went on to comment on two specific matters -- the operational arrangements for the organization, training, transportation, and deployment of the Cuban invasion brigade and the Agency's relation to the Cuban emigres. After commenting on his personal involvement and responsibility, he goes on:

Whether or not the operation would have succeeded if the Brigade had landed with its entire personnel and equipment is a matter which can be debated and on which, even today, military experts differ. Certainly, the responsibility for failure does not lie primarily in the main areas of criticism stressed in the Inspector General's report.

Of course, there are lessons to be learned as pointed out in the Taylor Reports. These reports, I believe, should be taken as the main basis for any review of the Agency's action in support of the operation.

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Cabell's memorandum on the survey dated 15 December 1961 is a horse of a different color. It reads in part as follows:

To comment on the subject report in detail would result in a paper approaching in length that of the Survey itself Such a commentary would, at a large number of pages, be required to note inaccuracies, omissions, distortions, unsupported allegations, and many erroneous conclusions. 79/

After referring to the Taylor Report, he goes on

It is not clear what purpose the Inspector General's report is intended to serve. If it is intended primarily as an evaluation of the Agency's role, it is deficient. Neither Mr. Dulles nor I was consulted in the preparation of the Inspector General's report. As a result, there are many unnecessary inaccuracies.

He makes an interesting point regarding policy guidance:

On the one hand, it attempts to describe the processes of national security policy-making as though this were a process in logical deduction like working a problem in geometry. According to the Inspector General's account, firm propositions should be laid down in writing and in advance from which correct conclusions as to proper actions must inevitably be drawn. In this respect the report goes far beyond an analysis of the Agency's role and is not accurate

The report misses objectivity by a wide margin In its present form, this is not a useful report for anyone inside or outside the Agency

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It might be noted that on 28 November, Cabell instructed Kirkpatrick that no copies of the survey were to be distributed -- other than those already in the hands of Messrs. Dulles, Bissell, Cabell, and Colonel King and Mr. Esterline of DDP -- without the authority of the DCI or DDCI. He specifically said that the restriction applied to the "President's Board of Intelligence Advisors." The reasons for this inclusion was that Kirkpatrick, in his memorandum transmitting the survey to Mr. McCone, had said that

the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board had requested a copy in time for Mr. Coyne to give a brief report on it at their December 9 meeting. 80/

The DDP analysis begins with a long discursive introduction and summary, followed by a detailed discussion and rebuttal of the charges of the survey. For the purposes of this history, its comments relating to policy guidance are the most interesting:

Another notable feature of the decisions that were responsible for failure to achieve control of the air (in addition to the fact that they were all Washington policy decisions) is that they were all interdepartmental decisions. Other elements of the Executive Branch were involved along with the Agency in making them.

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... it is necessary to have clearly in mind the nature of the decision making process in a project of this sort in order to understand how the ultimate failure came about. 81/

The analysis then discusses the inherent problems of the United States trying to accomplish a specific end while not allowing the action to become attributable, lest such attribution hurt the political and moral posture of the United States. It says:

... at every stage over a period of many months questions had to be answered in which operational effectiveness was weighted against the political requirements of deniability.

As these decisions presented themselves week after week, the Agency as the executive agent for the conduct of the operation was usually and naturally the advocate of effectiveness. The State Department and, with respect to certain matters, the Department of Defense were the guardians of the correctness of the country's political posture and thus the advocates of deniability. There was obviously no way in which a generalized policy could have been laid down which would have furnished guidance as to the way the many successive decisions ought to be made One of the consequences of this state of affairs was that prompt decisions were hard to obtain. Another was that, like so many interdepartmental decisions, these were subject to differing interpretations by different participants in the process

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The nature of the decision making process had other consequences as well. It explains in large measure the failure to write tidy and comprehensive plans and have them properly approved in writing by competent authority well in advance.

The analysis, while strongly disagreeing with much of the survey, is generally couched in moderate language. Moderation was, however, clearly not the mood of the senior DDP officers. C. Tracy Barnes, who had been Bissell's right-hand man in this matter, wrote Bissell a memorandum dated 19 January 1962 which was blistering. 82/ Barnes had done much of the work in preparing the DDP analysis. He wrote, in part:

In my opinion, the IG survey is most unfortunate for three reasons:

a. It is an incompetent job. The authors never understood the problems with which they were dealing

b. It is biased. Basically relevant evidence on vital issues was not only left out but never even mentioned. The Survey undertook only to present those items which suggested failures or inadequacies. These items, however, were not fully depicted so that a false picture was given

c. It is malicious, or, to put it alternatively, it is intentionally biased. Admittedly, this is a serious charge and

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is, at best, merely a statement of opinion In my view it could be supported solely on the basis of the Survey's total omission in many places of significantly relevant evidence. Such omissions are so excessive and one-sided as to substantiate the conclusion that they must have been intentional.

He went on to make several points. The survey said that the officers at all levels had been interviewed. While it was technically correct that the IG talked to both Bissell and Barnes, the discussions "were exceedingly brief and covered none of the real issues in the Survey."* Barnes also said that officers who had been interviewed believed their testimony had been manipulated and that the inspectors asking questions seemed to "desire to obtain facts or views to support judgments already formed." He went on to make recommendations regarding the resolution of the conflicting views regarding the Cuban operation and regarding future IG surveys.

Bissell, to whom Barnes's memorandum was addressed with the request that it be forwarded to

* The writer found in Kirkpatrick's office diaries only entries saying he had lunched with Bissell and Barnes. The writer was told by Bissell that he did not remember discussing the matter with Kirkpatrick while the survey was being written.

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the DCI, sent it to McCone under a covering memorandum dated 27 January 1962 saying:

I may say I am in agreement with Mr. Barnes that the Survey, largely by reason of the omission of material relevant to its conclusions, constitutes a highly biased document and the bias is of such a character that it must have been intentional. 83/

McCone, faced with these highly charged documents dealing with a matter which had taken place before he became Director, and knowing that General Taylor had prepared an independent report for the President, decided to bury the IG Survey and the comments on it. On 19 February 1962 he wrote to Dulles:

I have recieved your memorandum of 15 February 1962, containing your comments on the Inspector General's Survey of the Cuban operation. Copies of this memorandum, together with the DDP analysis of the survey, the comments made by General Cabell, Mr. Kirkpatrick, and the personal views expressed by Mr. Tracy Barnes, will be bound in the report and therefore will be known to anyone who might have occasion to read it. 84/

There is a buckslip attached to McCone's letter to Dulles dated 23 February 1962 and initialed "lec" which reads:

In connection with the CUBAN report, Mr. McCone asked that your copies of the IG

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report, DDP comments, DDCI memo, and your memo be forwarded to Mr. Chapin [Mr. McCone's Executive Assistant] to have them bound in one unit. This has been done and Mr. Chapin indicated your copies would be returned to your attention as soon as the binding has been completed.

In fact, the bound papers were not returnable to Dulles. McCone decided that all copies of the IG survey and the attachments should be impounded and not released to anyone without the express consent of the DCI. A copy is now in the possession of the Inspector General, held under the same restrictions.

McCone did send a copy of the survey and analysis plus Cabell's memorandum of comment to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board on 19 January 1962 under a letter which said in part,

... it is my personal opinion as a result of examinations I have made of this operation after the fact that both the report and the rebuttals are extreme. I believe an accurate appraisal of the Cuban effort and the reasons for failure rest some place in between the two points of view expressed in the report.

I believe it is safe to say the failure of the Cuban operation was Government-wide and in this respect the Agency must bear its full share (though not the entire) responsibility. For this reason, I would recommend that your board, in reviewing the Inspector General's Survey also review the comments and analysis of the DDCI and the DD/P. 85/

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Two interesting questions arise: First, why did Kirkpatrick initially deliver his survey only to McCone at a time when Dulles, who had ordered the survey, was still DCI? And second, why had the PFIAB asked for a copy before it was delivered to anyone? Barnes, in sending a copy of his critical memorandum to Kirkpatrick, wrote, "The distribution of the final Survey was so peculiar and contrary to normal practice that it raises an inference of intended partiality." Kirkpatrick, in replying to this point of Barnes's, said:

You apparently feel that there was something unusual in the distribution of the final report. The only thing unusual in it was that we had two Directors at the time, and Mr. McCone having asked for it received it as he was leaving for the West Coast on the day before Thanksgiving and everybody else got their copies on the day after Thanksgiving. Your concern as to how the President's Board and the Attorney General knew of the survey's existence can be answered very simply. In 1956 the President's Board in writing advised all agencies that all inspector general reports should be forwarded to them automatically. I don't believe it was a week after the Cuban operation that the direct question came from that Board as to whether an inspection was going to be done to which an affirmative reply was given. The Attorney General's source I do not know. 86/

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In comment on Kirkpatrick's reasons, it should be noted that the survey was dated "October 1961." Kirkpatrick's transmittal memorandum was dated 20 November 1961. Thanksgiving that year was 23 November. The survey was thus delivered to McCone on Monday, not Wednesday "the day before Thanksgiving," and perhaps in time for McCone to mention it to Dulles. Earman's memory as to the circumstances under which Dulles demanded a copy of the survey is so definite that he must be believed. The exact date on which Dulles finally got the survey is not known. It may well be that McCone read it on his Thanksgiving trip West and spoke to Dulles on his return. This chronology could conform to Kirkpatrick's statement that "everybody else" got their copies the day after Thanksgiving. It does not explain the gap between October (the date of the report) and late November, the time of distribution. Nor does it explain why, when a copy was given to McCone, no copies were given to Dulles or Cabell, who were then DCI and DDCI and in Washington. Cabell told the writer that both he and Dulles were angry at the way the survey had been distributed.

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As has been said, the survey was very critical of the management of the operation by the Agency, alleging failures to coordinate actions by various components, failure of DDP to consult adequately with the intelligence side of CIA, and the like. It was suitable to bolster the argument that the internal management of the Agency needed tightening up. There had been pressure on Dulles, particularly from the PBCFIA, to appoint an executive director or chief of staff to assure coordination within the Agency,* and a prime mover behind this pressure was probably Kirkpatrick, who coveted the position. It is the writer's belief, which was shared by Cabell and other knowledgeable officers, that Kirkpatrick used the survey as an instrument to make a case to the incoming Director and to the President's Board for the appointment of a chief of staff, so as to further his own ambitions.

The Taylor Report

On 22 April 1961, immediately after the Bay of Pigs fiasco, President Kennedy requested General

* See Volume IV, Chapter 4.

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Maxwell Taylor

to take a close look at all our practices and programs in the area of military and paramilitary, guerilla and anti-guerilla activity which fall short of outright war In the course of your study, I hope you will give special attention to the lessons which can be learned from recent events in Cuba. 87/

The President went on to say that he had asked the following individuals to be available to help General Taylor: Attorney-General Robert Kennedy from the Cabinet, Admiral Arleigh Burke from the JCS, and Dulles from the CIA. While these were to help General Taylor, the President made it clear that

What I want is your own report, drawing from past experience, to chart a path toward the future.

Such a report, which apparently went exhaustively into the Cuban operation, was prepared. At the Deputies Meeting on 14 June 1961:

Mr. Dulles: (a) Reported that the members of the Taylor Committee had met with the President yesterday and had discussed its findings and conclusions. The Director said that at the President's request there would be only one copy of the report which is to remain in the White House. Mr. Bissell (DDP) strongly recommended that the Director attempt to obtain a copy of the report for our files and suggested possibly the President would agree to placing this copy in a special file in

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the White House to be released to CIA after a period of six months or a year. Mr. Bissell also commented that in all probability it would be better for the Agency *not* to immediately have a copy in its possession since if there are any leaks, we could not be blamed. He also added that in his opinion it is most important that the Agency eventually have a copy of this report since it contains the most complete and best first-hand information on the Cuban program particularly since the information contained therein was furnished at a time when it was fresh in the minds of all those concerned with the operation.

The writer has found no evidence that a copy was given to the Agency. The DDP rebuttal to the IG report makes it clear that its authors had access to the Taylor Report, and Barnes told the writers that he had consulted it in McGeorge Bundy's office.

In his memorandum to McCone commenting on the IG survey mentioned above, Dulles said

As a member of the Taylor Committee appointed by the President, I participated fully in the work of his Committee and joined in his memorandum and oral reports to the President on this subject. While I do not now have a copy of those documents, I made only one or two reservations to the general conclusions and recommendations of these reports. I consider them to be sound and believe they should be accepted as the best available Survey of this particular operation

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These reports, I believe, should be taken as the main basis for any review of the Agency's actions in support of the operations. 88/

Gordon Gray was a member of the President's Foreign Intelligence Activities Board set up by President Kennedy in 1961. In discussing the Bay of Pigs matter with him in September 1970, the writer mentioned Dulles's comments on the Taylor Report. Gray said that the reservations mentioned by Dulles were important, as they probably related to the absence of an adequate discussion of airstrikes immediately prior to and at the time of the invasion and air cover of the invasion itself. Gray said that it had been understood at all times since planning began in 1960 that air cover was essential to success. Gray had been President Eisenhower's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, and thus a member of the Special Group in 1960. The matter of the understanding regarding air cover and President Kennedy's refusal to permit a second airstrike against Castro's airforce or to allow air cover after the invasion had started is, of course, one of the most controversial aspects of the debate

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about the Bay of Pigs. Associates of President Kennedy have reported their memories so as to insulate the President from responsibility for the fiasco. Gray thinks that General Taylor omitted an adequate discussion of air cover because it was such a sensitive point. It was not clear to the writer whether Gray had seen the Taylor Report. Gray talked about briefings, reading of parts, and the like. It is the writer's opinion that Gray had probably read it or had discussed it to such an extent with people who had read it that the actual reading might have been superfluous.

Dulles, after he retired, planned to write a piece for *Harper's* magazine on the subject. He prepared several drafts of the article but eventually decided not to go forward with publication. The reason for his change of mind does not appear in his files. Mrs. Dulles told the writer that his family urged him not to publish it. The drafts and his correspondence with *Harper's* magazine were in his personal files at the time of his death and, after being in the custody of the Agency for some months, were returned to Mrs. Dulles with the comment that

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there was no security objection to publication. 89/ Mrs. Dulles told the writer that she thought the best thing to do was to destroy the draft. The drafts, which were examined by the writer, were essentially anodyne, adding little or nothing new.

Some of those intimately acquainted with the Cuban operation express the view that the piece that Charles J. V. Murphy published in the September 1961 issue of *Fortune* magazine, is essentially correct. It is interesting to note that, although a copy of the manuscript was made available to Dulles before publication, he refused to read it. 90/ Such was not the reaction in the White House, which may also have had a copy of the manuscript. After publication, the White House prepared a list of alleged inaccuracies in Murphy's piece and presented it to him. Many of the statements which were challenged were those which linked the White House closely to the planning and execution of the operation. Murphy wrote a memorandum to Henry Luce on 13 September 1961 in which he detailed the alleged inaccuracies and defended his account. 91/ In general his rebuttals were that his information came from sources that he trusted, or that the points

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were trivial, or that the implications drawn by the White House paper were far-fetched. Murphy refused to change his story and Luce supported him, although the White House put considerable pressure on both Murphy and Luce, to the extent of sending General Taylor twice to New York to demand changes. 92/ Who Murphy had as sources is not known, but, as has been stated, Dulles was not one of them.

This incident is mentioned primarily to record the very early attempts of the White House staff to insulate President Kennedy to the extent possible from personal blame for the failure of the Bay of Pigs operation. Subsequent writings by those close to President Kennedy -- e.g., Robert Kennedy, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., and Theodore Sorensen -- have, in the opinion of many, recounted events or purported events in such a way as to further this insulation of President Kennedy. It should, of course, be noted that, from the beginning, President Kennedy publicly stated that as President he bore "full responsibility." 93/

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72. *Analysis*, Part IV, p. 7. (71, above).
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C O P Y

Appendix BSome Comments on the Staff Report of the
Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery
of the Senate Committee on Government
Operations

by Gordon Gray

A perusal of the staff report, which is based upon what the foreword to the report terms a "scholarly" study by the Subcommittee, discloses at once that the testimony of the Secretary of State has been selectively used. On page 7 it is stated:

Secretary of State Herter made this comment before the Subcommittee: "I was Chairman of OCB for 2 years. The feeling of utility varied an awful lot. At times you felt that you were being very useful. At other times you felt you were fanning the air or spending a lot of time reviewing minutiae. ... When you get into the formal sessions, you again apply yourself to paperwork. Sometimes you get yourself so bogged down in the editing of a word or a sentence that you say, 'My God, why am I spending so much time on this?'"

It would be more representative of Secretary Herter's testimony before the Committee if his entire statement were given:

Secretary Herter. I would never say there was any area in which improvements could not be made. I was Chairman of OCB for 2 years. The feeling of utility varied an awful lot. At times you felt that you

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were being very useful. At other times you felt you were fanning the air or spending a lot of time reviewing minutiae. There are two phases of it. The members of the OCB eat lunch together every Wednesday. In those discussions where there is very little staff anything can be brought up and those discussions are extraordinarily useful. Again it is a little like a staff meeting. When you get into the formal sessions, you again apply yourself to paper work. Sometimes you get yourself so bogged down in the editing of a word or a sentence that you say "My God, why am I spending so much time on this?" Other times pretty important decisions are made and made very quickly. If it were not for the OCB, you would have to have something similar. That is always the answer you come up with. There has to be one coordinating body somewhere where you can air out differences in the operational end of things, and often you find that something may have been decided upon but runs into operational difficulties that require a complete reassessment. From that point of view it is very valuable. ... Hearings Before the Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery of the Senate Committee on Government Operations, 86th Congress, 2nd Sess., pt. V, at 725 (1960).

Page 7 - "The OCB, assisted by an elaborate system of interagency working groups, prepares plans for carrying out the intent of NSC policies, transmits them to the departments and agencies, secures information on the status of programs underway, and reports back through the NSC to the President on progress."

The staff study description of the OCB's work could be misunderstood. The departments and agencies

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prepare the plans and the reports on the status of programs which are coördinated in the OCB working groups and approved by the Board members. Thus, the Board's work is the combined effort of the responsible action agencies which Board members consider and approve as representatives of those departments and agencies.

Page 7 - "The OCB is an interagency committee which lacks command authority. It can advise, but not direct, the operating agencies."

No one so far has been able to devise a legal means of giving an interagency committee the authority to direct operating agencies which derive their authority from the Constitution and legislation. The OCB was, therefore, not created to direct operating agencies. It was directed to coordinate the implementation of actions of departments and agencies without interposing itself between the President and the heads of those agencies.

Page 7 - "Also, the departments often bypass the OCB, pursuing their own interpretations of policy or engaging in 'bootleg' coordination through extramural means."

The OCB was not created to coordinate all actions of executive departments and agencies. Its mandate

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is to ensure that necessary coordination takes place even though such coordination is done outside the formal OCB mechanism. The Board has consistently encouraged informal interagency coordination without the requirement that such coordination be done through the OCB.

Page 9 - "As a corollary to the strict limitation of attendance, a written record of decisions should be maintained and given necessary distribution."

Appearing as it does under the heading "New Directions," the statement tends to imply that written records of decisions are not now maintained or, if so, are not now given necessary distribution, or both. As indicated above, every policy decision approved by the President at the NSC is recorded in writing in a numbered policy paper or in a Record of Actions for each Council meeting. The Record of Actions is distributed by the Executive Secretary to the NSC members, advisers, participants and observers, as well as to other interested officials, such as the Secretaries of the military departments and the Chiefs of Staff.

Page 9 - "The case of abolishing the OCB is strong."

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Because the staff study itself does not state the case for abolishing the OCB, it is necessary to refer to the testimony before the Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery:

- a As has been pointed out earlier, Secretary Herter testified that there has to be one coordinating body somewhere in the government structure.
- b Secretary of Defense Gates, in answer to a question by Senator Jackson as to whether he felt the OCB had been functioning well, replied, "yes." He added:

"My personal experience with the OCB was limited to a very short period of time. That was during the time I was Deputy Secretary of Defense from last June until December. I was one of the group of Under Secretaries among the agencies who attended the OCB Wednesday meetings. They meet weekly at lunch and after lunch. I felt that the meetings I participated in were most helpful for coordinating the actions and implementation of NSC policies. Those were always attended, in those days, by Bob Murphy and the AEC man and the ICA representative and the Under Secretary of the Treasury. It is largely the Under Secretary level in the agencies involved. I thought that they were helpful and useful and out of them came a good method of followthrough. I think the OCB mechanism or something like it is vital to assist in coordinating the implementation of NSC policies."

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- c One of the witnesses who had an intimate and long experience with the OCB, General Robert Cutler, was asked no questions about the operation or effectiveness of the OCB.
- d Three witnesses who made comments critical of the OCB, Mr. Paul H. Nitze, Mr. Robert Bowie and General Maxwell D. Taylor, each prefaced his remarks by acknowledging that his information about the OCB was limited or secondhand.

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~~SECRET~~Appendix CPrincipal Documents Dealing with the Control
of Covert Action

- 26 Jul 47 National Security Act of 1947, Sec. 102
 (d) (5) p. 6.
- 18 Jun 48 NSC 10/2
 Purpose: To combat Communism and
 strengthen non-Communist world to re-
 sist Communism. DCI was to assure that
 operations are consistent with US
 foreign and military policies. Oper-
 ations were to be carried out so that
 United States can plausibly deny respon-
 sibility.
- 4 Apr 51 Presidential Directive
 Establishes Psychological Strategy
 Board
- 23 Oct 51 NSC 10/5
 Supplements NSC 10/2 by:
 (1) expanding capabilities and
 intensifying operations
 (2) directing Psychological Strategy
 Board to:
 (a) determine desirability and
 feasibility of programs and
 major projects of covert
 action;
 (b) establish scope, pace, and
 timing of covert operations
 and relative priorities.
- 2 Sep 53 Executive Order 10483
 Abolishes PSB, establishes Operations
 Coordinating Board (OCB)
- 15 Mar 54 NSC 5412
 Supersedes NSC 10/2 and 10/5. The
 purposes of covert action remain the
 same, however, as does the injunction
 concerning non-attributability.

The OCB will review covert operations.

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DCI is to assure consistency of covert operations with US foreign and military policies through "designated representatives" of the Secretaries of State and Defense.

12 Mar 55 NSC 5412/1

Amends NSC 5412 by establishing within OCB a Planning Coordination Group to be advised of major covert programs and to be the normal channel for giving policy approval for such programs.

28 Dec 55 NSC 5412/2

Supersedes NSC 5412 and 5412/1. Abolishes Planning Coordination Group; OCB to be consulted by DCI. Policy approval to be obtained from "designated representatives" of the Secretaries of State and Defense (of rank of Assistant Secretary or above) and of President. (In 1957 the "designated representatives" came to be known as the "Special Group.")

27 Mar 57 Annex to NSC 5412/2

Specifies procedures for policy approval and provides that in especially sensitive cases involving only foreign policy, DCI might get guidance from Secretary of State alone.

18 Feb 61 E.O. 10920

Abolishes OCB.

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